Annex 2 Response to BOD/2018/12 DOC Effective Partnership Review clarifying roles, responsibilities, accountabilities and risks in GPE

Contents

Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
ADB	Asian Development Bank
BOD	Board of Directors
CA	Coordinating Agency
CAP	Country Assistance Plan
CSCF	Civil Society Challenge Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCP	Developing Country Partner
DFID	Department for International Development
DPF	Divisional Performance Framework
DPG	Development Partners Group
DRACI	Decision making authority, Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed
DSO	Departmental Strategic Objective
EF	Evaluation Framework
EPR	Effective Partnerships Review
ESPDG	Education Sector Plan Development Grant
ESPIG	Education Sector Program Implementation Grant
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict Affected States
FPA	Financial Procedures Agreement
GA	Grant Agent
GPC	Grants and Performance Committee
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
IRP	Independent Review Panel
LEG	Local Education Group
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PDG	Program Development Grant
PPA	Programme Partnership Agreement
PRD	Policy and Research Division
QAR	Quality Assurance Review
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WB	World Bank

Introduction

Objectives of report

Board Resolution 7th November 2018	
a. *Outline the extent to which accountability, authorities, and risks are clearly assigned in the current model in relation to each of the different GPE grants and elements of the planning and program lifecycle. Reference should be made to core GPE governance documents including the Charter, fund governance document, FPA, and other relevant documentation.*	Addressed in section 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a and Annex 3 and Annex 4.
a. *Identify any areas of inefficiency, duplication, misalignment or gaps in accountability in the model. This analysis should be informed by consultation with representatives of key grant agents. The consultations with key grant agents should seek to identify any institutional limitations with respect to executing accountability, authorities, and managing risks.*	Addressed in section 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b and Annex 3 and Annex 4.
b. *Identify options, implications, and recommendations for addressing issues raised in the analysis and a revised work plan for the Effective Partnerships Review workstream focused on implementation of such recommendations or, where necessary, further analysis of options*	Addressed in section 1c, 2c, 3c, 4c and Annex 3 and Annex 4.

This paper responds to the Board's resolution of 7th November 2018 (Table 1).

Table 1: *Board resolution of 7th November 2018*

Process Summary

The Secretariat commissioned IOD PARC to develop options to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of GPE's country-level options to fulfil the requirements of workstream 1 of the effective Partnership Review. The objectives were to:

- Clarify roles, responsibilities, authorities, accountabilities, resourcing and risk at country level to ensure GPE makes optimal use of its resources
- Provide a set of options for the GPE Board to use in making a decision to improve effective partnership working at country level regarding grant development and management and for the broader partnership agenda of leveraging effective collaboration, policies and strategies to deliver results

The recommendations presented in this proposal are derived through extensive consultation, pressure testing, and refinement with country actors (DCPs, CAs, GAs, and Secretariat staff) with experience of GPE's processes in different country contexts.

The recommendations and analysis in this report builds on the Oxford Policy Management (OPM) report findings, reported to the Board in June 2018, supplemented by document analysis. GPE has undertaken several institutional reviews and evaluations which reference

challenges to effectiveness, efficiency and partnership working associated with lack of clarity on roles and accountabilities. These include the Evans Review (2012), the Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support (2015), Interim GPE evaluation (2015), More Effective Operational Platform (2015), the OPM Examination of key actors' roles in GPE's country-level operational model towards GPE 2020 (2018). A summary of the findings of these reviews is in Annex 7.

Analysis of the GPE actors' Decision-making authority, Responsibilities, Accountabilities, as well as when they are Consulted and Informed is summarised in Annex 4: *Decision Making, Responsibilities, Accountabilities, Consulted, Informed* (DRACI). This set out analysis of activities during the programme cycle highlights gaps and duplications in the distribution of accountabilities and authorities. With so many actors responsible for different elements of coordination and grant management, it is critical to increase clarity on who is responsible for what, as well as who is accountable for what to whom, as well as to ensure this is effectively agreed at the appropriate level, communicated and followed up.

An initial version of options was discussed with GPC in October 2018. DCPs were consulted on the same version of the options. Subsequently a revised set of options was brought to the Board Retreat in November. The proposals in this paper have taken account of the Board's views. In addition, there have been bilateral discussions with the World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO, DFID and Save the Children in their role as Grant Agents to review the institutional parameters relevant to the proposed changes. A summary of the feedback from Grant Agents is presented in Annex 5.

Scope and structure of report

The structure of the paper is aligned to the key steps and processes in the GPE country lifecycle as depicted in broad terms in Figure 1

Figure 1: *Simplified GPE country-level model*

Each section of this report is structured as follows:

a) Outline of the current model
b) Identification of areas of inefficiency, duplication, misalignment or gaps in accountability in the model
c) Identification of options, implications, and recommendations for addressing the issues raised in the analysis.

Guiding principles for the proposals set out in this paper.

GPE's three country objectives in GPE 2020– to strengthen sector planning and policy implementation, to support mutual accountability through inclusive policy dialogue and monitoring and to ensure efficient and effective delivery of GPE support – underpin the proposals below. The added value of GPE is its focus on the facilitation of policy and sector dialogue, supported and strengthened through GPE grant funding to strengthen sector planning and implementation GPE's conceptual model is to use relatively small sized funds to have a transformative impact on education systems at country level. GPE interventions need to ensure that there is both effective and inclusive sector planning and dialogue/coordination and efficient and effective grant implementation to strengthen systems.

The recommendations presented in this report focus on clarifying accountability and responsibility to enable GPE partners deliver more effectively on all three objectives.

Discussion with country level actors, DCPs and GPC Committees and Board identified a clear appetite for **decentralized model of accountability,** based on the commitment of country level partners and supported by some changes in process and clarification of responsibility and accountabilities. The alternative option of a more centralized compliance model was not seen as consistent with the GPE model of partnership, and to have more onerous process and resource implications.

Centralized 'command and control' model based upon strengthened Secretariat oversight- Increased compliance/centralized quality assurance

Decentralized mutual accountability with increased accountabilities and authority for country actors – Increased GA accountability /Reduced process/burden

*Figure 2: Clear stakeholder appetite for increased **decentralized accountability** versus a more centralized command and control model*

Proposals designed to promote decentralized accountability and reduced transaction costs. The proposals set out in this paper are designed to support greater decentralization of accountability, authority and risk, while reducing transaction costs where possible and ensuring that there is a global consistency of approach. The proposals focus on the country level, but there are some implications for GPE partners globally, and for the Secretariat in facilitating the proposals elaborated below to support the Partnership. These are identified where relevant. Mechanisms for oversight for accountability are included. The proposals also refocus partnership activities on coordination and on strengthening the ESP through the ESPDG, to ensure an ESPIG better aligned with the ESP and with stronger country ownership, and to strengthen the partnership focus on supporting and monitoring ESP implementation.

Proposals are not mutually exclusive and can be accepted jointly or independently. Some proposals are capable of modification, so that it is possible to accept a subset of elements. However, the proposals are often interrelated, so that such modifications may impact on the effectiveness or value of others. This means that during operationalization over the next months, specific attention would need to be given to such modifications, if any, and their impact on the overall concept.

The Board decision proposed in the main report to which each proposal relates is shown above the proposal.

Guiding Definitions	
GPE	• GPE does not refer to the GPE Secretariat, but the collective group of partners who have signed up to the GPE Compact, and that the Secretariat serves the partnership.
Accountability	• Accountability in this context means being answerable for managing quality, risks, results, institutional and compliance with policies and procedures applicable to assigned responsibilities. Accountability ensures actions and decisions are subject to oversight to guarantee that initiatives meet their stated objectives. • The [accountable] entity/actor has an obligation to explain/justify its conduct • The forum (Partnership) can pose questions and pass judgment • The [accountable] entity/actor may face consequences
Responsibility	• Refers to being the owner of a task or process • Responsibility can be shared by more than one actor. • No legal/contractual responsibilities
Decision-making authority	• Decision making authority means the power to manage activities and make decisions to determine a course of action in a particular situation.

1. Strengthening the country level partnership and policy dialogue

Figure 3: Sector dialogue and coordination in the GPE country-level model.

a. Current model for sector dialogue and coordination within the partnership

Sector dialogue: authorities, accountabilities and responsibilities in the current model for country level actors

	DCP	LEG	GA	CA	Secretariat	Board and Committees	Trustee
Authority	DCPs set the education agenda.	Involved in decision-making processes throughout the programme cycle, as an advisory forum.	None	None	None	Mobilizing resources for GPE and advocating for increases to domestic and external funding for education in developing countries.	The Board, in consultation with the trustee, approves the grant agent for each proposal

	DCP	LEG	GA	CA	Secretariat	Board and Committees	Trustee
Accountability	DCPs commit[1] to working toward achieving Sustainable Development Goal 4. They are accountable to the goals set in the ESP	None	As a member of the LEG, participates fully and meaningfully in country-led dialogue mechanisms for planning, implementing monitoring and evaluating the ESP	None - Mutual accountability to the LEG.	Quality assurance of grant process	Board sets strategic direction for strengthening and growing the partnership, financial oversight, establishing policies, acquitting fiduciary duties, evaluating performance, managing and mitigating risks and delivering constant improvement.	
Responsibility	Leading the ESP	Platform for sector dialogue and technical and financial support to the ESP/TEP.	GA country management systems (e.g. Country management unit); annual reports to the Secretariat.	CA communicates with the Secretariat- often the partner/lead or co-chair/co-lead of the DPG, with the DCP	Support the government and the LEG along the various steps of the GPE processes and technical support to the country mainly via the CA, GA, and the DCP	Mobilizing resources for GPE Advocating for increases to domestic and external funding for education Ensuring GPE's alignment to the global debate on education	

The GPE approach to mutual accountability between partners is set out in the GPE Charter, which was updated in June 2018 by the Board. This includes the 2002 GPE Compact commitments made by the developing country partners, and the donors, multilateral agencies, civil society organizations, private foundations and the private sector to deliver an effective partnership. The Charter also sets out the roles and responsibilities of country level actors including the Developing Country Partner (DCP) government, the Local Education Group (LEG), civil society, development partners and the private sector as well as the Coordinating Agency (CA), the Grant Agent (GA) and the Secretariat (Annex 3). In addition, there are Terms of Reference (TOR) for CAs and for GAs for ESPIGs, and guidance for LEGs as well as guidance on different GPE grants that set out the roles of different actors in the grant processes. There are no TORs for the Secretariat at country level; only internal job descriptions for Secretariat country focal points ('Country Leads'). There are no specific TORs for the ESPDG GA. Non-mutual accountabilities are identified in guidance to grant processes and the Financial Procedures Agreement. Annex 3 contains a summary of actors'

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[1] GPE Charter

accountabilities, authorities, responsibilities, and risk at country level and the gaps and inefficiencies that exist in the current model.

Developing Country Partners (Government) leads sector policy dialogue. In becoming a member of GPE, DCPs commit to the GPE partnership model. Through this DCP government signs up to the GPE Charter and commit to developing and implementing quality Education Sector Plans (ESP)/Transitional Education Plans (TEP), increasing domestic financing to education, and demonstrating results. The model is intended to put the DCP in the driver's seat for policy dialogue and for delivering results guided by the government's ESP. GPE in-country partners and to some extent the Secretariat (through the process on the GPE funding model requirements) are expected to support the government in the planning process and in joint and harmonized monitoring of ESP implementation through joint sector reviews.

The LEG provides critical guidance to policy dialogue. The term Local Education Group (LEG) refers to the sector dialogue groups that are normally part of the existing aid coordination and policy dialogue architecture in a country. The LEG is led by the DCP and by GPE definition should include development partners, civil society including teacher representatives, and private organisations. The extent to which all these groups are represented varies. The LEG provides critical input and guidance to develop, implement, and monitor education plans. As the LEG is not a legal entity, it is not "accountable" for results or activities but serves as the platform for sector coordination and policy dialogue. The accountabilities of individual LEG members who are GPE members are set out in the GPE Charter but how this functions at country level is highly inconsistent. The LEG is part of decision-making processes around GPE grants, with the emphasis on decision-making by reaching consensus. In some countries, these groups have an explicit framework ('*Cadre Partenarial*') that establishes its role, expectations of members, etc. The LEG is the key forum for periodic joint sector reviews to take stock of the implementation of education sector plans and discuss key implementation challenges and the effectiveness of policies and strategies.

While the LEG is central to the effectiveness of the partnership, the risk of the LEG having insufficient capacity, lack of clarity regarding the LEG's role and responsibilities and those of its members, is high, particularly in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS).

Grant Agents are expected to participate in policy dialogue. Grant Agents are expected, as part of the LEG, to engage in sector dialogue at the various stages of the policy cycle. In line with the emphasis on the sector plan and harmonized monitoring of sector activities, the GA should also contribute to situate monitoring of ESPIG activities within the joint monitoring of the overall ESP. Currently, there are no specific or separate roles and accountabilities assigned for Grant Agents of Education Sector Plan Development Grants.

Coordinating Agency is key to GPE's policy dialogue objective. The core function of a Coordinating Agency is, in conjunction with the DCP, to coordinate and facilitate development partners' participation in the LEG to ensure an evidence-based policy dialogue that is inclusive of a wide range of development partners. This is linked to the GPE objective of strengthening and harmonizing policy dialogue. However, GPE processes add several other GPE-specific functions: to provide communications support; to communicate with the GPE Secretariat, and respond to special requests from the Secretariat; to follow and ensure compliance with GPE processes by stakeholders in country for joining the GPE, selection of grant agents, GPE financing, and for support to application processes for GPE financing; to facilitate lessons learnt on grant implementation.

Secretariat role as broker and facilitator. The Secretariat's role in policy dialogue is as broker and facilitator for the partnership. Across the partnership processes, the Secretariat provides information, guidance, oversight and quality assurance support to decision making about GPE funds within the broader policy framework. The Secretariat undertakes a Quality Assurance process organized in three phases to ensure the quality of the ESPIG process and application and a) its alignment with the education sector plan, and b) that is aligned with GPE guiding policies and meets GPE funding model requirements. The Secretariat also undertakes grant related problem solving and adaptation to context where needed, and reports to GPC on this. The Secretariat plays an important role in identifying and sharing lessons learned to improve GPE processes

Board provides strategic direction. GPE's Board of Directors (the Board) sets overall policies and strategies, makes funding decision and ensures financial risk management, and mobilizes political support.

The Grants and Performance Committee (GPC) plays a critical role as gate keeper and risk assessor for the Board and the Partnership as a whole. The GPC works closely with the Secretariat on complex cases, which often require problem solving and capacity building, when assessing grant applications and revisions. Lack of capacity and mechanisms to do this better at country level can overload the GPC and can lead to delays in guidance to the Secretariat and partners for addressing country level issues in a timely manner. In practice the GPC is overloaded to address weaknesses and gaps in the systems for country level implementation.

Trustee role. The World Bank acts as the Trustee for GPE. As Trustee, the Bank provides administrative and financial services to the Board. The Trustee receives contributions from Contributors and transfers funds to the Grant Agents. Together with the GPE Secretariat, the Trustee records funding decisions made by the Board.

b. Key issues, gaps, and inefficiencies in sector dialogue and coordination within the partnership

Partnership behaviours are not defined, constraining the partnership effectiveness: The current GPE mutual accountability compact sets out expectations of commitments, but without a clear specification of the behaviours required to make it effective or of the commitments made. There are cases of weak coordination and harmonisation of programmes at country level, where institutions pursue their own priorities rather than collaborating to support the ESP. The LEG, which is the primary locus for coordination does not consistently have a strong input into defining CA and GA roles. The specific role of country actors (CA, GA, DCP, LEG, Secretariat) are not defined at country level in relation to how they will contribute to coordination for systems strengthening. . The development partner roles and commitments expressed in the GPE Charter are not translated to behaviours at country level or within the LEG. This leads to unclear accountabilities, duplication of activity and less efficient use of resources, as well as weakening coordination.

No clear accountability for ensuring partnership coordination at country level: While the DCP government has the overall lead role for policy dialogue, the responsibility for coordination of development partners falls mainly on the Coordinating Agency. However, other actors also have responsibilities. As GPE partners and LEG members, in-country development partners share the responsibility for applying partnership principles and

supporting coordinated, harmonized dialogue with the government, yet there is no accountability mechanism for this.

Flexibility to meet country context: Ways of engaging and working, country actor roles and contributions, results need to be adapted to country context. Some countries need more technical and capacity building support than others, and implementation arrangements that are adapted to capacity and context.

Lack of clearly defined accountabilities, authorities and responsibilities for actors: A multiplicity of guidance documents, and TORs for the ESPIG GA and the CA provide information about the intended roles and responsibilities of key actors. However, these do not adequately define accountability, authority and responsibility or clearly articulate the difference in responsibilities between actors at different stages of the country level processes. This leads to gaps, duplications, risk and misalignment for the activities necessary to the policy and programme cycle. There are overlaps in practice between the CA, GA and Secretariat. There is a high level of ambiguity concerning the role of the Secretariat at country level. There are few mechanisms in place to ensure that actors fulfil their roles as intended.

> **Secretariat role at country level**
>
> In one country, the Secretariat country lead was approached by development partners to intervene on an issue with the GA. The country lead did so, but the GA then complained to the Secretariat that the Country Lead was overstepping his/her role. The Secretariat considered that it would not be helpful to the country level partnership to explain that the other partners had asked for the country lead to intervene. The situation put the country lead in a difficult position with the GA that impacted the relationship.
>
> In some cases where the Grant Agent selection process has been difficult, government or partners have sought the Secretariat's approval for the final GA selection. In accordance with the GA selection process, the Secretariat does not sign off on or approve the Grant Agent selection. However, the Secretariat includes an assessment of the selection process within its quality assurance process. Being candid in this assessment can increase the discomfort of the government in a situation that has already put them in an awkward position with its development partners, so the Secretariat struggles to find the right balance between providing a candid quality assessment and supporting the government through a difficult situation created by GPE processes.

Variable effectiveness of LEG and other country actors: The LEG is a group of individual representatives of institutions with different mandates and without a clearly assigned authority. LEGs have variable capacity and their responsibilities and roles depend on specific agreements and mechanisms at country level. The authority for partner behaviours as members of the LEG is not clear. In some cases, the strength of the GA or CA influences the effectiveness of the government in their lead role, either positively or negatively. The performance of CA and GA at country level is variable.

Centrality of the DCP: A core concept of the GPE model is the centrality of the DCP. The DCP must be in the driver's seat for sector planning and policy dialogue to be effective and linked to the actual implementation of government budgets and activities. However, in practice some DCPs feel that the power dynamics of donor/funder versus recipient means that this centrality can be undermined. Limited government capacity is also a constraining

factor the DCP playing a central role. In these cases, there is a need for greater support to reaffirm the DCP role and increase their involvement, oversight and ownership of ESP and GPE grant development and implementation.

Process-heavy approach: GPE has refined and developed processes over years to address challenges and adapt to the demands of the funding model, resulting in a plethora of guidelines and processes. These are perceived as burdensome for DCPs and GAs in particular and are sometimes duplicative. There are associated transaction costs.

c.   Options for strengthening the partnership and policy dialogue

Mutual accountability requires a mechanism. There is no mechanism for ensuring that country level partners fulfil their roles as agreed to enable accountability. Under current arrangements of GA and CA actors are primarily accountable to their own institution's requirements for their performance, with a potential for prioritising these over GPE and the country partnership. There is no clear accountability for members of the LEG who are not in a CA or GA role, and no clear accountability for the Secretariat's support to the country level partnership.

To address strengthened accountability for policy dialogue and partnership , **strengthen the country-level partnership and policy dialogue** by introducing a **mutual accountability mechanism** for all partners that provides a light-touch governance mechanism and clarifies roles and behaviours

Country presence required for effective sector strengthening should be specified. In practice the level of country presence of the GA varies, as well as the availability of Secretariat support to country level, not always in relation to country needs. One element of the review of roles may be to specify the level of GA country presence and of Secretariat support required for each context. Level of country presence and support could be relative to risks identified in the GPE Operational Risk Framework[2] .

DECISION A: Strengthen the country-level partnership and policy dialogue by reinforcing the role of the Coordinating Agency to facilitate policy dialogue, introducing a mutual accountability mechanism for all partners that provides a light-touch governance mechanism for behaviours, and significantly reducing processes and transaction costs.

Proposal	Issues addressed
a) Establish a clear mutual accountability mechanism through a country level Partnership Compact which outlines the responsibilities, contributions and behaviours for GA, CA, DCP, Secretariat and Local Education Group members individually and as a group. This would build on the practice in some countries to establish an agreed framework for sector coordination that lays out both the role of the group and the expectations from its members. The Partnership Compact will outline the role, focus and expectations of the LEG as well as expected roles and behaviours from all participating partners. Required levels of presence for	Addresses lack of clarity on mutual accountabilities. Addresses lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities

[2] Progress Update, Revised Risk Taxonomy, GPE, August 2018

the CA, GA and Secretariat will be informed by the country's level of risk. It will be agreed by the country partners. Facilitated by the Secretariat where requested.	
b) Identify indicators for the behaviours for each actor within the country Partnership Compact. Indicators would be taken from a standard set of KPIs, set globally, selected to suit country context. The LEG would identify and agree relevant country level KPIs and indicators. The mechanism for assessing how well actors are fulfilling indicators would be a 360°-degree feedback process, undertaken annually. This can be reported as a summary to the LEG to review and would provide an opportunity for identification of any problems and for capacity building where needed. Support for these could be provided or facilitated by the CA, or if requested, by the Secretariat to improve performance.	Provides a mechanism for oversight for mutual accountabilities; reduces transaction costs related to duplication and ambiguities of roles and responsibilities

Impacts, implications and risks of implementing the proposal

Area of impact	Impacts, implications and risks
Authority	Introduces a shared authority for all partners to agree Partnership Compact and indicators.
Accountabilities	Identifies accountability for behaviours to support coordination at country level and provides a mechanism for oversight for mutual accountabilities.
Responsibilities	Secretariat under GPC guidance responsible for developing outline country KPIs at global level; Coordinating Agency responsible for facilitating development of Compact and brokering Compact when roles not fulfilled; but can request Secretariat support Country partners responsible for engaging and committing to the Partnership Compact and providing 360 feedback
Duplication	Reduces duplication in roles by defining actors' contribution to coordination
Efficiency	Increases efficiency by increasing harmonised behaviours and contributions to ESP Reduces transactional costs by reducing overlaps in CA, GA, Secretariat roles. Small additional transactional costs for partners to set up Compact and undertake annual feedback
Risk to Partnership	Potential risk to partnership dynamics if a partner does not fulfil expectations (at global and country levels) Risk that LEG does not perceive the added value of such a process and doesn't engage
Risk to individual actors	Potential risk of showing underperformance – reputational risk
Resources	Small additional resource implication for the Secretariat to develop KPIs and support CA in brokering roles/providing support to address problems. The latter would likely be offset by reduction in problem-solving related to lack of clarity on roles.

Enabling effective coordination and policy dialogue: GPE grant processes and communication expectations can be numerous and burdensome; currently the CA usually is the actor managing these on behalf of the LEG and the DCP. As a consequence, the CA has

less available time to focus on its core activity of sector coordination and facilitation. A further frustration is that the CA specific reporting and communications requirements for GPE are often duplicated with the DCP or GA. DCPs observe that they are not always sufficiently engaged with the grant application process, and often lack capacity to engage fully with LEGs.

As a result, coordination and sector dialogue can suffer, as the grant process dominates available resources. Since one of the key aims of GPE is to be transformative in strengthening sector coordination, this has a major impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Partnership.

Proposal	Issues to address
a) Provide funding (via the ESPDG or other channel to be agreed) for an administrative post based in and recruited by the Government that would be responsible for the current CA roles with respect to communication and facilitation of GPE processes.	Strengthens country ownership. Clarifies role of CA to focus on policy dialogue coordination. Reduced burden on CA to undertake GPE specific processes and information needs.
b) The post will sit within a relevant Government ministry e.g. MOE and act as key liaison with the LEG and with the Secretariat on GPE processes and communications.	Increased ownership, capacity strengthening of DCP.

Impacts, implications and risks of implementing the proposal

Area of impact	Implications, impacts and risks
Authority	Increased authority of DCP over GPE processes
Accountabilities	MOE based administrative post will clarify accountability for fulfilling some GPE processes.
Responsibilities	Changes responsibilities of CA and DCP. Strengthens clarity of CA responsibility for sector dialogue and DCP responsibilities for GPE related transactions.
Duplication	Reduces duplication of processes
Efficiency	Reduces transaction costs for CA
Risk to GPE partnership	Will need to find a willing Grant Agent to facilitate the administration of funds to the Government to fund the post.
Risk to individual actors	DCP may face challenges in managing the administrative post if it has insufficient capacity
Resources	Will require resourcing to the level of one full time administrative post per country receiving grant.

2. Strengthening the Education Sector Planning Process

Figure 4: *ESP development and appraisal in the GPE country-level model.*

a. The Education Sector Planning Process within the current model

Education Sector Plan Development Grant: authorities, accountabilities and responsibilities of country level actors in current model

	DCP	LEG	GA	CA	Secretariat	Board and Committees
Authority	DCP is accountable for the development of the ESP. DCP appoints the GA. The Secretariat approves the ESPDG by delegated authority and is accountable for approving PDG.	Involved in decision-making processes throughout the programme cycle, as an advisory forum.	None	None	Secretariat approves PDG.	

	DCP	LEG	GA	CA	Secretariat	Board and Committees
Accountability	The DCP is responsible for the design of the ESPDG process and inclusion of stakeholders for the ESPDG.		Establishes bilateral fiduciary agreements with DCP.			
Responsibility	DCP is accountable for the development of the ESP. DCP appoints the GA. The Secretariat approves the ESPDG by delegated authority and is accountable for approving PDG.	Technical support to ESP. Endorse GA. LEG endorses ESP. LEG engages reviewers for independent appraisal of the ESP.	GA prepares the application following GPE Guidelines. Technical support and corrective action in support of ESP implementation.	CA coordinates the independent assessment of the ESP CA shares ESP Appraisal report with Secretariat. Grant endorsement process facilitated by CA.	Support through ESPDG Country Lead/Secretariat support (as requested). ESP Development feedback shared through Secretariat comments on ESP Quality assurance/ oversight of ESP appraisal. Monitoring and evaluating GPE-funded grants.	Tracking progress of the programmatic and financial performance of grants

ESPIG funding model requirement: The Education Sector Plan Implementation Grant (ESPIG) requires the development, adoption and endorsement of a 'credible' government owned and financed education sector plan as a prerequisite to funding.

ESPDG application: DCPs can apply for the Education Sector Plan Development Grant (ESPDG) to provide funding for the education sector analysis and to the subsequent development of a new or updated ESP/TEP. Selection of the ESPDG GA is based upon a mutually agreed decision as part of broader sector dialogue. Final approval for the GA sits in principle with the GPE Board, but in practice with the Secretariat/FRC oversight to ensure that the GAs meet the minimum GPE standards. The criteria for selection of the ESPDG GA is the organization's technical ability to participate in policy dialogue, enhance the planning capacity of the Government, and work with the LEG.

ESP adoption and approval: With support from the ESPDG and its Grant Agent, the DCP is accountable for undertaking sector analysis and then developing the plan. Appraisal of the ESP must be independent if the country wishes to apply for an ESPIG. The ESP must be endorsed by development partners and the role of the DCP is to adopt the plan. Implementation and monitoring of the ESP is the responsibility of the DCP, including the organization of Joint Sector Reviews to facilitate transparent and coordinated dialogue around ESP implementation.

b. Key issues, gaps, and inefficiencies in the Education Sector planning process

DCPs do not feel that they are consistently in the lead for the ESPDG process and that it is driven by GPE processes and in some cases by the GA's own priorities. There are cases when the ESP is developed without full engagement and ownership of the DCP. This is can partly be due the GA driving the planning process rather than the Government; in other cases, the ESP is developed by consultants, with insufficient engagement with the Government and other stakeholders. System capacity and corresponding aid delivery modalities are not consistently well addressed.

GA role in ESPDG

In one country, an ESPDG was issued to a Grant Agent to facilitate the planning process. However, the government contacted the GPE Secretariat complaining that the Grant Agent was taking over what should be their own planning process. The GA on their part may have felt they were simply ensuring the process was evidence-based and technically sound; however, this is a case where country ownership was undermined. This risks undermining the sector plan's adoption through government mechanisms, funding through government budgets, and the government's commitment to its implementation.

ESPIG can take the focus away from the ESP. The line of sight on the development, appraisal, and validation of the Education Sector Plan should be the foundation and focus of the government and Development Partners' work. However, it is often distorted by the partners' focus on ESPIG, which has grant funding and demanding processes attached. This risks diverting focus from the ESP and country needs, and how GPE can add most value to the ESP. In some cases, the ESPDG GA remains GA for the ESPIG; this introduces a potential conflict of interest. There is a missed opportunity for the ESPDG to be used formally to set the context and requirements for the ESPIG, thereby enhancing the relevance of the ESPIG to the ESP, and better aligning the grants.

ESPIG distorting focus from ESP

The announcement of the Maximum Country Allocation to governments often results in the intent to mobilize the resources as quickly as possible. Despite intentions, the GPE funding model requirement of an evidence-based ESP easily distorts the flow of sector analysis and planning, since the funding causes government and partners to rush through the planning process. Even if the plan on paper meets quality criteria, there is reason to question whether it is fully owned and likely to be implemented in such cases.

ESPDG GA role is not clearly specified. The role of the GA for the ESPDG is not sufficiently specified as one of building capacity in the Government and accompanying it. Without clarity on expectations, there is a risk that the GA focuses more on completing the ESPDG application and procuring the agreed technical support services to implement the grant than to accompany the government in the development of its ESP.

Use of appraisal of ESP: There is potential to improve the alignment, quality, and implementability of the ESP by using the independent appraisal of the ESP more consistently to inform effective country partner dialogue on ways to improve the ESP prior to adoption and endorsement. Currently countries receiving an ESPDG but not applying for an ESPIG are not technically required to have an independent appraisal, as this requirement is

> In some fragile contexts, the concept of a transitional plan is experienced as of lesser value than a full ESP, and the choice of a full ESP is made although the country may be better off with a more limited medium-term plan that focuses on key priorities.

linked to the ESPIG requirements. It is important also to maintain DCP ownership in this process, and support country capacity building.

c. Options for strengthening the education sector planning process

DECISION B: Strengthen the Education Sector planning process by clarifying the role and independence of the ESPDG Grant Agent and reducing both grant agent reporting requirements and ESP criteria.

Proposal	Implications, impacts and risks
a) Introduce guidance to formalize a requirement that the GA for ESPDG is a different institution to the GA for ESPIG, other than in exceptional, specified circumstances.	Increases GA accountability for strengthening the ESP through the ESPDG
b) Introduce standards for the GA role in ESPDG by developing specific TORs for the ESPDG GA, including the GA responsibility to facilitate the ESP process in partnership and to support system capacity building role.	Clarifies GA role and responsibility. Strengthens country ownership and partnership alignment for the ESP.
c) Remove the requirement to report to the Secretariat on the ESPDG apart from a financial report, as the outcome of the grant is a finalized and endorsed ESP of quality and the accountability for delivering this outcome is to the LEG.	Reduces reporting requirements
d) In the longer term, review the applicability of ESP criteria in different contexts (ongoing with GPC), and make appropriate reductions in process and GA reporting	Reduced transaction costs and processes
e) The ESPDG process will include the development of a scoping note for the ESPIG, in consultation with the LEG, which identifies where GPE funds can add most value, and includes the strategies for learning, equity and efficiency developed through consultative process. The scoping note should make reference to ESA and	Ensures ESPIGs are well aligned to ESA needs and ESP strategies.

Proposal	Implications, impacts and risks
ESP around the core GPE objectives of equity and learning outcomes.	

Impacts, implications and risks of implementing the proposal

Area of Impact	Impacts, implications and risks
Authority	Increased authority for DCP in developing the ESP and ESPDG
Accountabilities	Clearer accountability for the GA to implement the EPSDG to strengthen the ESP
Responsibilities	Clearer responsibility for the ESPDG GA to build system capacity and facilitate partner engagement in the ESP
Duplication	Avoids overlap of GA roles in ESPDG and ESPIG
Efficiency	Increases partnership alignment with ESPIG. Reduces reporting requirements for ESPDG Additional transactional costs where there is a change in GA between grants
Risk to GPE partnership	Potential loss of actors available to be GA for ESPDG
Risk to individual actors	GA will need to consider which grant it will bid to be GA for (ESPDG or ESPIG);
Resources	Low resource implications

3. Streamlining the Education Sector Plan Implementation Grant Application Process

Figure 5: *ESPIG program development and approval in the GPE country-level model.*

a. The Education Sector Plan Implementation Grant (ESPIG) Application Process in the current model

Education Sector Plan Implementation Grant: authorities, accountabilities and responsibilities of country level actors in current model

	DCP	LEG	CA	GA	Secretariat	Board
Authority					Approval for non-minor revisions to grant.	GPC) Approves non-material revisions to the Grant. At any time: The Board may recommend cancellation of the grant. GPC can be engaged in role negotiation as needed.

	DCP	LEG	CA	GA	Secretariat	Board
Accountability	Accountable (to its citizens) for delivering sector results for the implementation of the ESP.			Administration of grant implementation including use of resources -Accountable to GPE policies and guidelines and GA's own policies and procedures) -Grant monitoring		
Responsibility	DCP is responsible for endorsing the GA selection, as lead of the LEG.	Technical input to ESPIG Select and endorse GA. Revisions made with DCP, LEG, and GA	Develops draft application package (with GA) CA coordinates submission of documents for Quality Assurance Process. Supports Joint Sector Reviews Facilitates Conflict Resolution.	Develops draft application package. Reports on implementation of ESPIG to LEG and Secretariat annually. Considers recommendations of the QAR Revisions made with DCP, LEG, and GA	Review of GA choice and selection process through QAR I report shared with the LEG. Review of draft program document through QAR II Monitoring and evaluating GPE-funded grants	

Currently, eligible DCPs are able to apply for funding to implement components of the ESP/TEP with an ESPIG. Following consultation with the LEG, the DCP appoints a GA to manage the ESPIG. The DCP normally signs a bilateral fiduciary agreement with the Grant Agent for the ESPIG; for some GAs the support is incorporated into existing country programme agreements. The GA can apply for Programme Development Grant (PDG) funding for developing the ESPIG. Implementation and monitoring of the ESPIG within the ESP more broadly is the responsibility of the DCP, including the organization of Joint Sector Reviews to facilitate transparent and coordinated dialogue around ESP implementation.

b. Gaps, challenges, and inefficiencies in the ESPIG application

There are current examples where the ESPIG does not fully align with DCP priorities, and where the DCP is not adequately involved to ensure ownership of the ESPIG process and content. There are instances when LEG members seek to influence ESPIG content to reflect their own priorities, detracting from the contribution of the ESPIG to the ESP and sector dialogue. This can lead to the ESPIG supporting a fragmented program, which is not well aligned with the ESP.

The GA can also contribute to weak alignment if there is not a good fit between the ESPIG GA's skills and competencies and the ESPIG requirements. Other issues arise where the GA inadequately engaging with the DCP and LEG during the ESPIG process and is not sufficiently accountable to the DCP and LEG for the content of the ESPIG application. Some grants reflect GA priorities rather than the ESP priorities, and there is a lack of visibility for the GPE grant in relation to the GA programme.

Selection of Grant Agent

There are several situations where the GA selection has resulted in tensions and a deterioration of partnership, at the discomfort of government and in direct contrast to GPE's country level objective of strengthening and rendering more inclusive and effective country level policy dialogue. There have been cases where partners have held separate, behind the scenes conversations with government to incentivize their selection. There has been at least one case where a government selected one partner because another was challenging the minister on particular issues of concern, even though the selected partner would use a much less aligned implementation modality. In some cases, partners seem to consider GA selection as an opportunity for fundraising or agency positioning rather than an exercise to consider which partner is best placed to deliver the technical and fiduciary support to strengthen capacity, build systems, and deliver results. These approaches to securing the role as GA risk undermining the GPE objective to strengthen systems and partnerships.

The quality assurance (QAR) for the ESPIG is experienced as burdensome, and for some GAs duplicative, and does not always lead to increased government ownership and greater alignment of ESPIG with the ESP. Transaction costs for ESPIG for all parties are high due to the complex funding model, the QAR process and lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities

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GA authority, LEG involvement and Secretariat role in QA process

Once selected, Grant Agents are in charge of developing ESPIG financed programs. However, there is ambiguity and different expectations around LEG involvement, and following the 2015 decisions to strengthen the operating model, a strengthened quality assurance process by the Secretariat to oversee that applications meet the quality standards adopted by the GPC. In one country, the GA, government, development partners and Secretariat dialogue during this process was particularly difficult. The GA through its own quality assurance process sought to ensure that the program they would be responsible for was appropriate relative to the context; development partners including the CA expected to be consulted on details of the grant development process; the Secretariat played out its quality assurance role based on its understanding of the expectations of the GPC and Board in terms of standards and the ambition of results-based financing. The resulting number and extent of comments provided to various drafts of the program document by different partners exceeded the reasonable, yet it was not clear that all these transactions led to a better program.

c.   Options to streamline the ESPIG application process

DECISION C: Streamline the ESPIG application process to ensure that GPE funds are used strategically and introduce an Independent Review Panel to improve upstream quality assessment.

| Proposal	Issues addressed
a) A scoping note will be developed by the ESPDG GA (funded through ESPDG) under the leadership of the DCP and in consultation with the LEG to guide the basic priorities and scope of the ESPIG.	Increases centrality of DCP and alignment with ESP. Reduces transaction costs by agreeing priorities at the start.
b) Open, transparent selection of the GA that can best deliver on the ESPIG priorities identified in the LEG's scoping note. This GA should be different to the GA for the ESPDG.	Avoids perception of potential conflict of interest. Increases country ownership of ESPIG and clarity of expectations of GA, and strengthens its alignment to the ESP
c) The ESPIG GA develops a concept note for the ESPIG guided by the scoping note without the need for further LEG review	Increases authority of GA. Reduces process/burden on GA and process-related transaction costs.
d) An Independent Review Panel (IRP) will review the GA's Concept note for the ESPIG considering the Scoping note, the Education Sector Analysis and ESP needs, and will either refer the proposal back for further work or allow it to proceed (potentially with recommendations). IRP review early on in process will ensure ESPIG reflects ESP priorities. The IRP will report to the GPC.	Strengthens quality, relevance and independence of ESPIG concept note. Removes Secretariat QAR I review from concept note process.
e) GA will develop a full proposal addressing the IRP recommendations. The GA will be accountable for ensuring the program reflects priorities agreed by Government and LEG.	Clarifies that the GA is accountable to the Government and LEG for the ESPIG content. Enables the GA to proceed with greater authority and without process-heavy consultations with the LEG.
f) The Secretariat QA processes will be streamlined and differentiated according to the strength of the GA QA processes[3],to have three main aims; to ensure the proposal does not significantly differ from the ITP approved concept and LEG expectations, to verify that the country meets GPE funding model requirements, and to have due consideration for the GPC quality standards.	Reduces duplication of QA processes. Increases authority of GA for ESPIG preparation.
h) Secretariat will undertake final review with recommendations to GPC, and GPC will review final ESPIG proposal with recommendations for Board approval as at present.	Clear accountability to GPC/Board and authority for the Board (as at present).

[3] Ongoing QA pilot overseen by the GPC will inform differentiated approach to QA.

Impacts, implications and risks of implementing the proposal

Area of impact	Implications, impacts and risks
Authority	Increases authority of DCP regarding design of ESPIG; Increases authority of GA in preparing ESPIG; Maintains authority of Board in approving ESPIG
Accountabilities	Clearer accountability of GA for ESPIG to DCP/LEG
Responsibilities	Clearer responsibility of GA for ESPIG development
Duplication	Reduces duplication and burden of QAR processes
Efficiency	Reduces transaction costs of QAR. Increases ESPIG alignment with ESP
Risk to GPE partnership	Potential for competition for GA role, impact on partnership dynamics. IRP if not composed correctly and with robust mechanisms may take decisions that do not fully reflect realities at country level
Risk to individual actors	GA Institutions may experience conflict of accountabilities; GAs may consider they are at risk if the ESPIG is potentially difficult or expensive to deliver.
Resources	IRP process and independent advisers, and IRP support from the Secretariat will require additional resources

4. Strengthening Transparency and Accountability of the Grant Agent

Figure 6: ESPIG implementation and monitoring in the GPE country-level model.

a. Current GA accountabilities for grant implementation

Grant Agent Accountabilities The Grant Agent supports the government in the development, implementation and monitoring of the GPE-funded education sector plan and education sector programs.[4] Grant Agents are accountable to the Board of Directors for the use of GPE funds and delivery of activities financed by such funds[5]. Grant Agents for the ESPDG are responsible for organizing technical support and other grant financed activities in support of the ESP process. These grants are either directly administered by the Grant Agent to procure technical assistance and services, or transferred to the government to do so. Funds for the PDG are not transferred to the DCP as this is for use by the ESPIG GA to finance the development of the ESPIG proposal including any necessary due diligence processes. GPE ESPIGs are typically transferred to the country (DCP) via Grant Agents, although in some cases, notably in fragile and conflict affected settings, the Grant Agent may also play an implementation role and/or transfer funds to other implementing partners such as UN Agencies, International NGOs, and Local NGOs .   The Grant Agent signs a Financial Procedures Agreement with the GPE Trustee which sets out the standard terms and

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[4] Per the Charter
[5] Per Section 8.1 of the Financial Procedures Agreement

conditions that apply to the commitment, transfer and management of GPE funds allocated to the Grant Agent by the GPE Board.

In order to be eligible to act as a Grant Agent, organizations must meet minimum standards established by the GPE Board and acceptable to the Trustee. For funds that are transferred to the government, Grant Agents will typically sign their own form of grant agreement with the DCP and/or other Implementing Partners or incorporate the activities within an existing country programme agreement.

The GA is ideally chosen based upon its operational and fiduciary capacity within a given country as well as its ability to provide the desired technical support to implementation. It uses its own operational and fiduciary mechanisms to administer, manage, and report on grants. In practice, the GA has two masters: to its own internal processes and management structures, and to its operational and fiduciary roles within the partnership.

ESPIG: The GA for the ESPIG is also the GA for the PDG, since the PDG is specifically allocated to cover the GA's costs for developing a grant proposal. The grant agent is eligible to apply for the PDG as soon as it has been selected by the Government and endorsed by the LEG. The GA for the ESPIG is often a different organization than the ESPDG GA but not explicitly so.

ESPIG monitoring: In addition to the GA's own monitoring systems, the Operational Risk Framework assesses where the Secretariat should provide additional oversight of ESPIGs implementation under the oversight of the Grants and Performance Committee (GPC). GAs are required to provide an ESPIG progress report to the GPE on an annual basis. These are analysed by the Secretariat in preparation for the annual Portfolio Review. The GPE results framework includes an indicator on GA follow-up to audit issues. The Secretariat monitors audit reports and follows up with GAs to verify that required follow-up actions have been taken. The GA is also required to report any cases of misuse of funds immediately to the Secretariat, who follows the GPE misuse policy to inform the Board as required. There is a risk of duplication of elements of GPE monitoring.

b. Current issues, gaps, and inefficiencies surrounding GA accountability for grant implementation

Accountability for grant administration and implementation: GPE operates a decentralised model working through a diverse range of Grant Agents. There is variation in effectiveness of support to grant implementation, and it is not clear to all actors whom GAs are accountable to and for what. While TORs are in place for the ESPIG GA,[6] and there is guidance for developing the grant processes in country, there are only limited legal accountability measures or mechanisms for grant management and implementation. Annex 3 outlines the accountabilities prescribed to the country actors through GPE's core governance documents. The GPE Charter sets out the governance parameters for the Partnership, the Fund Governance Document is the core governance document for the GPE Fund.

The Financial Procedures Agreement (FPA) is the agreement between the Trustee on behalf of the GPE Fund (*as GPE has no legal personality*) and the Grant Agents. The FPA sets out

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[6] There are TORs for the ESPIG GA but no TORs for the ESPDG GA.

the standard terms and conditions that apply to the commitment, transfer and management of GPE funds allocated to the Grant Agent by the GPE Board. The FPA is the only document that sets out legally contractual accountabilities between the Grant Agent and GPE Board. The Financial Procedures Agreement provides a mechanism for fiduciary management and reporting on grant progress. Within the FPA the GPE Board has the right to cancel or reduce the grant and require repayment of unspent grant, subject to honouring outstanding liabilities, but this facility has not been used to date, except when external circumstances have required the grant to end early.

There is no clear GA accountability for the quality of performance for grant management including for those GAs which have a role in implementation There is no reporting on the "how" of grant management such as the extent of partner engagement. GA's do not always manage and implement grants well, with no mechanism to require improvement where needed. There are also cited issues of delayed disbursements and utilisation of GPE grant if the GA prioritises its own programme implementation over that of GPE.

GA accountability for ESPIG

In one country, the GA and government failed to come to an agreement on the details of implementation of a grant component that had been included in the approved ESPIG application. The Secretariat raised questions about the component during monitoring missions and reported the grant as delayed in annual portfolio reviews, but the component was never launched. In the end, the issue came to light in an extension request to the GPC, who questioned why there had been no accountability for implementing the component.

The content of grant reporting is of variable quality, which weakens accountability for grant and partnership results. Progress and results are reported are not always promptly and clearly reported to the LEG and DCP, which reduces transparency and country ownership. Each GA uses their own reporting systems, which differ so that GPE does not have a consistent minimum data set for oversight on GA and grant performance and results, and which limits the possibility of aggregating grant results at global level.

c. Options for strengthening GA accountability and transparency for grant implementation

DECISION D: To strengthen transparency and accountability of the Grant Agent for how it fulfils its role.

Proposal	Issues addressed
a) GAs, in conjunction with DCPs, to provide periodic updates to the LEG on ESPIG progress, key issues and strategies to ensure transparency and to surface issues pertinent for sector dialogue. This is envisaged as relatively high-level reporting e.g. through slides to show key issues arising, or report on good progress.	Strengthens country ownership and accountability of the GA and other actors. Strengthens sector dialogue and can help build system capacity through better shared understanding of challenges. Identifies any problems at an early stage
b) Develop KPIs for grant management and implementation which assess GA activities and behaviours to support country level results e.g. how they will engage with partners, facilitate DCP reporting for JSRs. KPIs to be	Strengthens accountability of GA and enhances partnership effectiveness. Strengthens authority of LEG.

Proposal	Issues addressed
selected by the LEG in discussion with partners and support from the Secretariat to suit context from a standard set agreed globally. Indicator measures to be agreed at country level, report to the LEG.	
c) GAs requesting implementation support costs funded from within the Maximum Country Allocation will be expected to report to the LEG on KPIs (to be agreed for each ESPIG) that relate to how they fulfil their role (e.g. if the GA has a role in providing technical assistance).	Strengthens GA accountability for supporting implementation.
d) Agency Fees to GAs will be transferred to GAs in the same proportion as grant funds are transferred. If the grant allocation is not fully expended, the agency fee will be reduced in proportion to the amount of unused funds. This provides a direct link between GA fees and Grant utilization (with disbursement being a proxy for implementation).	Increases GA accountability for disbursement and facilitating implementation.

Impacts, implications and risks of implementing the proposal

Area of impact	Implications, impacts and risks
Authority	Strengthens DCP, LEG authority for grant use.
Accountabilities	Clarifies accountabilities of GA for grant management, support to implementation and disbursement.
Responsibilities	GA becomes responsible for regular reporting on KPIs to LEG
Duplication	May introduce duplicate reporting processes/content for GAs
Efficiency	Increase efficiency of use of GPE funds.
Risk to GPE partnership	Potential negative impact on partnership dynamics if a GA underperforms on KPIs or facilitating implementation World Bank may not be able to facilitate revised approach to Agency Fees. Some Grant Agents may not be able to formally recognize responsibility to report to LEG in contractual arrangements.
Risk to individual actors	GA Institutions may experience conflict of accountabilities
Resources	Possible resources needed by GA s to carry out additional reporting to LEG.

5. Overlap of Institutional Arrangements and the EPR

The recommendations as outlined should all be implementable under GPE's current institutional arrangements with the World Bank.

The role of the Grant Agent is not expected to fundamentally change, nor is there a specific recommendation to expand Grant Agent eligibility to Developing Country Partners or National Non-Governmental Organizations.

The recommendations themselves are not expected to have major incremental resource implications for the GPE Secretariat.

As GPE is currently not a legal entity, it does not have its own legal agreement with Grant Agents. Instead, the World Bank as Trustee signs Financial Procedures Agreements with Grant Agents that outline the standard terms and conditions governing the commitment, transfer, and use of GPE Funds. Some of the recommendations proposed will result in changes to the FPAs and this will mean agreement of the Trustee to such changes and their engagement with Grant Agents in finalizing updated FPAs.

Proposals 2 and 4, and to some extent proposal 1, all include stronger accountability mechanisms to the Partnership. Currently the World Bank GAs are accountable to the Bank and use the Bank's reporting and QA processes. The proposals above introduce a more explicit requirement for accountability to GPE for GPE grant-related activities, with a potential for GPE - through the Secretariat - to require improvements in performance if necessary. At present the Secretariat's oversight role over the Bank on behalf of the Board is ambiguous. However, it is understood that the World Bank hosting offer acknowledges the role of the Secretariat in supporting the GPE Board to fulfil its oversight requirements.

Proposal 4 introduces mechanisms for linking payment of agency fees to rate of grant disbursement. These constitute a change in current arrangements but are consistent with good practice. The change would require a change in GPE and World Bank procedures.

Proposals 1, 2, 4 will require changes in the Financial Procedures Agreement to be agreed with the Trustee to ensure that the FPA refences the changes appropriately within the sections on the Use of Funds and Records and Reporting.

Annex 3: Mapping of Accountability set out in GPE Governance Documents

Main area of work						Key Governance Documents granting authority and accountability		
	Sector Strengthening	Grant Management				GPE Charter	Fund Governance	Financial Procedures Agreement
Developing Country Partner	✓		• Leads effective and inclusive mechanisms for policy dialogue;			✓		
	✓		• Develops an evidence-based ESP			✓		
	✓		• Ensures effective implementation of the ESP;			✓		
	✓		• Prioritizes domestic financing for education			✓		
		✓	• Strengthens education management and information systems;			✓		
		✓	• Engages with the Secretariat, develops proposals for activities for financing by GPE in consultation with the LEG;			✓		
		✓	• Ensures that GPE resources are managed in accordance with GPE and GA policies and procedures.					
Local Education Group	✓		• Consultative forum for the government's development of ESP/(TEP)			✓		
	✓		• Reviews independent appraisal of the draft ESP or TEP and advisory forum for the government on adjustments for the finalization.			✓		
	✓		• Forum for the ESP/ TEP endorsement by partners.			✓		
	✓		• Contributes to the organization of a government-led joint sector review.			✓		
	✓		• Contributes to reports to the GPE Board through the Secretariat on education sector progress and challenges, and on education sector financing (domestic and external sources).			✓		
	✓					✓		
		✓	• Reviews sector diagnostics and analysis.			✓		
		✓	• Engages in processes to apply for GPE funding, including the selection of a grant agent.			✓		
		✓	• Receives updates and reports from GAs on GPE funding.			✓		
		✓	• Applies GPE's conflict resolution procedures.			✓		
Coordinating Agency	✓		• Fosters and develops the relationship between the development partners and the DCP government, promotes the inclusion of nongovernmental organizations in the work of the LEG, and helps mobilize development partners and, to the extent possible, other LEG partners for meetings.			✓		
	✓		• Leads/coordinates the development partners in their role of supporting and monitoring the development, independent appraisal, endorsement, and implementation and joint monitoring of the ESP.			✓		
		✓	• The communication link between the government of the developing country partner, LEG partners and the Secretariat.			✓		
		✓	• Reports on progress of ESP implementation, including on funding commitments and disbursements to the developing country partner, the Board and GPE at large through the Secretariat.			✓		
		✓	• Supports GPE grant processes, including facilitating the selection of a GA.			✓		
		✓	• Facilitates the implementation of the conflict resolution procedures			✓		

Role	Responsibility			
	Develops a program for GPE financing at the country level — in close collaboration with the government, consistent with the ESP, in consultation with CA and other LEG members, supports the government's proposal for financing by the GPE.	✓		
	Provides fiduciary oversight and continued technical support and corrective action in support of the implementation by the government of the ESPs and programs, ensuring effective implementation according to the Board-approved grant application, the grant agent's policies and the implementation by the government of the ESPs and programs, ensuring effective implementation according to the Board-approved grant application, the grant agent's policies and procedures, and GPE policies.	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓	
	Utilizes country procedures and systems where possible and as agreed upon with the LEG and approved by the Board.			
	As a member of the LEG, participates fully and meaningfully in country-led dialogue mechanisms for planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating the ESP.			
	Promotes transparency and proactively shares evidence and lessons learned with the LEG and with the Board through the Secretariat.			
	Reports to the LEG on outcomes and impact of GPE investments, following agreed standards for monitoring and evaluation.			
	Appraising proposal of DCP for activities in support of implementation of its ESP			
Grant Agent	Develops a program for GPE financing at the country level supports the government's proposal for financing by the GPE.	✓		
	Ensures disbursements from allocations, approved by the GPE Board, for the implementation by the government of agreed plans and programs.	✓		
	Provides fiduciary oversight and continued technical support and corrective action in support of the implementation by the government of the ESPs and programs, ensuring effective implementation according to the Board-approved grant application, the grant agent's policies and procedures, and GPE policies.	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓ ✓
	Reports to the GPE on outcomes and impact of GPE investments, following agreed standards for monitoring and evaluation.			✓
	Entering into an FPA as appropriate with Trustee			
	entering into Grant Agreements with the selected recipients, including but not limited to, Developing Country Partners and/or other organizations that will implement the Activities;			
	GA is responsible for the use of the grant in accordance with its own policies and procedures, Board's procedures, the Board's approval, the applicable GPE policies and the Financial Procedures Agreement			
	The GA and developing country partner government should consult the other members of the LEG and solicit their explicit support for the proposed revision.			
Secretariat	Leading fundraising efforts for the GPE Fund and supporting increases to domestic and external funding for education.	✓		
	Working with all partners to promote effective communication of education data and results reporting.	✓	✓	
	Providing support to the LEG and coordinating agencies to strengthen the in-country process, in particular in the following ways:	✓	✓	
	i. Taking the lead in collecting information on the country processes leading to ESP endorsement and sharing this with other GPE partners.	✓	✓	
	ii. Participating in and providing quality support to the planning process and monitoring results through joint sector reviews.	✓	✓	
	iii. Promoting and supporting LEG processes that include all categories of GPE partners.			
	providing guidance to Local Education Groups, Coordinating Agencies, Supervising Entities and Managing Entities[7] on the processes and requirements for Proposals			

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[7] The Governance documents refer to Supervising Entities and Managing Entities, and have not been revised to take account of changes in terminology made since they were published. For accuracy, the document language is retained here.

		• Promoting and supporting effective exchange of knowledge and good practice across the partnership. • Facilitating the sharing of lessons learned and data collected from developing partners within GPE • Country Support: All activities related to the interface between the Secretariat and eligible GPE developing country partners. This covers the broad spectrum of: Education Sector Plan analysis and development; education sector monitoring. The Board delegates authority to the Secretariat to assess whether a program revision is non-minor and/or material, based on the Program Revision Notification				
		• Providing oversight of the efficient and effective expenditure of GPE resources with appropriate safeguards and accountability and reporting thereon. • Providing monitoring of the results at the country and global levels, in line with GPE strategies, objectives and policies. • Providing quality assurance review of grant applications. • Providing oversight of the implementation of the risk management policy and operational risk framework. • Monitoring and evaluating GPE-funded grants. • Receiving and consolidating annual implementation results reports from supervising entities • The Board delegates authority to the Secretariat to assess whether a program revision is non-minor and/or material, based on the Program Revision Notification. Secretariat can approve a material change when the total grant is $10million or less	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓			
Board and committees		• At any time, the Board of Directors may cancel all or part of an allocation. • Approving the eligibility and prioritization of Developing Country Partners to submit Proposals; • Approving the Supervising Entity or Managing Entity for each Proposal, in consultation with the Trustee; • Deciding, in consultation with the Trustee and the Supervising Entities and Managing Entities, on the requirements for the content/frequency for the periodic financial reports to be provided by Supervising Entities and Managing Entities for an Allocation and for the portfolio of Allocations of the Supervising Entity or Managing Entity; • Deciding, in consultation with the Supervising Entities and Managing Entities on the requirements for the content of and frequency for the implementation reports to be provided by Supervising Entities and Managing Entities to the Board • Through the Secretariat for an Allocation and for the portfolio of Allocations of the Supervising Entity or Managing Entity; • Reviewing the financial and implementation reports (*all from Fund Governance document, all grant management)*			✓	✓

Annex 4: Mapping of current model: DRACI Analysis

This matrix outlines the extent to which accountability, authorities, and risks are clearly assigned in the current model in relation to each of the different GPE grants and elements of the planning and program lifecycle and identifies areas of inefficiency, duplication, misalignment or gaps in accountability in the model, aligning these to potential solutions. A DRACI chart is a matrix of all the activities or decision-making authorities undertaken in an organisation set against all the people or roles. Below is a DRACI analysis of the activities undertaken by GPE partners in the programme cycle showing who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed and who has Decision-making authority. Definitions used are as follows:

Definitions used for the DRACI analysis

Decision-making authority	Decision making authority means the power to manage activities and make decisions to determine a course of action in a particular situation.
Accountable	Accountability means being answerable for managing quality, risks, results, institutional and compliance with policies and procedures applicable to assigned responsibilities. Accountability ensures actions and decisions are subject to oversight to guarantee that initiatives meet their stated objectives. The [accountable] entity/actor has an obligation to explain/justify its conduct The forum (Partnership) can pose questions and pass judgment The [accountable] entity/actor may face consequences
Responsible	Responsibility refers to being the owner of a task or process Responsibility can be shared by more than one actor. No legal/contractual responsibilities
Consulted	Those whose opinions are sought Two-way communication
Informed	Those who are kept up-to-date on progress, often only on completion of the task or deliverable; Just one-way communication

Note: the Corresponding Recommendations numbers are those of the recommendations in the main report this annex follows: Effective Partnership Review: decentralized accountability and reduced transaction costs, Meeting of the Board of Directors, December 6-7, 2018

D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee	Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
(Pre-grant) Partnership/Sector Process													
Sector dialogue and coordination	A/D	R	R	R	I	I			DCP: Leads policy dialogue and develops ESP based on evidence and consultation. Accountable to its own citizens. Accountable for promoting sector progress and reporting on sector results. Leads effective and inclusive mechanisms including JSR. Prioritizes domestic financing to education and ensures reporting of budgeting and expenditures. Strengthens EMIS. **LEG:** Supports government's efforts to achieve SDG 4 and GPE goals. Provides meaningful and effective support to sector analysis and development and monitoring of the ESP. Reviews and discusses sector diagnostics/analysis. (ESPIG) **GA:** Participates in ESP development and country-led dialogue mechanism as part of the LEG, including supporting CA in promoting JSRs and the DCP in providing information on progress to LEG. **CA:** Responsible for mobilizing the LEG and coordinating DPs. Fosters relations between DCP	**Weak Accountability:** Weak **Government** accountability for sector dialogue and coordination. Weak ESPIG GA accountability for sector dialogue/coordination especially in supporting JSR process in link w/ ESPIG reporting and in coordination with CA. No formal accountability for sector dialogue and coordination for the CA and the DPs. ESP implementation reports not systematically produced or sufficiently frequent for course correction. No accountability (for any actor) on promotion of more inclusive LEGs. **Inefficiencies:** ESP standards and ESP Appraisal at times seen as merely cumbersome rather than helpful to country (DCPs view that the heavy process may	Risks sit with the DCP for the effectiveness of the processes (to deliver results in the education sector). CA capacity is stretched across its own institutional commitments, responsibility for coordinating GPE processes, and for supporting policy dialogue. Heavy workload of CA may prevent a healthy rotation of CAs among DPs. The capacity, level of activity, modality of stakeholder inclusion, and agreed priorities of the LEG are variable. Non-strategic use of or overreliance on consultants to develop ESPs can reduce capacity development of national ministries. If the ESP standards are not used wisely through	**Recommendation A1** **Recommendation A2** **Recommendation A3** **Recommendation A4** **Recommendation A 5** **Recommendation A6**	GPE Charter Country specific program document; Results Framework Grant Agent Terms of Reference, December 2017 Grant and Performance Committee Terms of Reference, February 2017 LEG effectiveness principles. Guidelines Education Sector Plan Development Grant, June 2016 Guidelines for Preparation and Appraisal of ESP, June 2016 Fund Governance Document, November 2013 How GPE works in Partner Countries, 2017
Commitment and contribution to SDG and GPE goals and objectives	A	R	R	R	I	I							
LEG establishment and functioning	R	R	R	R	I	I							
Participation in GPE global governance/coordination w/ Secretariat	A	R/C	R	R	R	D	D						
Sharing lessons across the Partnership	R	R	R	R	A	I							
Contribution to and reporting on outcomes and impact of GPE investments	A	C	A	A	A	I							

	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee	Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies													
Development of Education Sector Plan (including sector analysis)	A/D	R	R	R	C	I	I		and DPs. Serves as communications link between Secretariat and DCP. Reports to Secretariat on ESP implementation progress. Leads or facilitates DP tasks for ESP independent appraisal and endorsement. **Secretariat:** Provides technical support and guidance on GPE country process/standards. Processes and approves ESPDG applications. Provides comments to draft ESP using IIEP-GPE quality standards. Verifies independence of appraisal and use of IIEP-GPE standards. Provide support to LEG and CA to strengthen in-country process (planning/monitoring through JSRs, promoting inclusive LEG) **Committees:** GPC oversees GPE ESP quality assurance processes (through approval of ESPIG requirement fulfilment upon application/QAR 3 report submission).	help produce nice-looking documents but too complex for implementation or not fully owned by DCP stakeholders). ESPIG requirement on ESP and timeline (endorsement latest 3 months before ESPIG application) sometimes distorts the process (rush/use of consultants to finalize). **Variable capacity and inefficiencies:** LEG and CA may have capacity and bandwidth issues to play their roles fully (including due to heavy burden of coordinating with GPE Secretariat which takes away time from policy dialogue/coordination). Lack of incentive or penalty to carry out JSR (including monitoring of domestic financing for education).	policy dialogue of LEG, the end product can undermine country ownership or implementability of the plan.		
ESP Appraisal & endorsement	A/R	R/D	R	R/A	C	I	I						
ESP implementation	A/D	I	I	I	I	I							
ESP monitoring	R/A	R	R	R	R	I	I						

Grant-Related Processes													
Education Sector Plan Development Grant (ESPDG)	*To support DCPs' education sector planning process*												

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	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee		Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies														
Selection of ESPDG Grant Agent	A/D	C		R	I	I	I			**DCP**: Approves final selection of GA and signs off on the ESPDG application **LEG:** Serves as consultative/advisory forum for GA selection criteria and selection; validates ESPDG proposal; supports sector	**Issues of DCP ownership:** DCP wants more leadership over ESPDG/Sector Planning Process. GA/CA/LEG not able to fully ensure a ESPDG process that enhances quality while	Risk of conflict of interest to potentially have the same GA for the ESPDG and the ESPIG (as there is no guideline that they should be different)	**Recommendation B1** **Recommendation B2**	Standard Selection Process for Grant Agents, February 2016; ESPDG Guidelines Operational Framework for Requirements and
Development of ESPDG application	R	C	A	C	C	I	I							
Approval of ESPDG	I	I	I	I	A/D	I	I							

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ESPDG - Implementation (ESA/ESP development)	D/A	C	A	C	C	I	I		analysis/planning. Provides feedback to Secretariat on lessons learnt from ESPDG. **GA:** Has capacity to provide technical support and build capacity for planning/analysis. Develops ESPDG application in collaboration with DCP/LEG. Works closely with government to ensure capacity building and ownership of the process, with LEG throughout the process. - Administers ESPDG according to approved application and the FPA with the GPE Trustee and GPE policies/guidelines. CA is responsible for a transparent dialogue/process of identification of GA and keeps Secretariat informed. CA distributes ESPDG report provides feedback to Secretariat on lessons learned from ESPDG process. Endorses ESPDG application confirming LEG participation. **Secretariat:** Ensures that country level partners are informed of the expected process of GA selection, GPE funding requirements and quality assurance milestones. Leads quality assurance of ESPDG application and decisions on ESPDG applications. **Trustee:** Process transfer of funds to GA	ensuring ownership and capacity development. **Inefficiencies:** DCPs report that GPE processes are time consuming and burdensome.			Incentives in the Funding Model
Implementation of ESP (ESPIG)											

	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee		Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies														
Selection of ESPIG Grant Agent	D	C/R	C	R	C	I				**DCP:** Approves final GA selection; Leads the development of the ESPIG **LEG** Develops TOR for GA selection using Standard Selection Process for Grant Agents and based on generic GA ToR and endorses GA selection ; Participates in design of GPE programme **GA** selected on the basis of how well fiduciary and operational arrangements and capacities meet GPE objectives around systems building and capacity strengthening relative to the context; Develops program and related documents for Secretariat's Quality Assurance Review process. Appraisal of proposal against its own policies and procedures. Ensures alignment with broader sector dialogue. **CA**: facilitates GA selection and supports consensus building. Facilitates discussion on funding model requirements and Variable Part (discussion around applying, timing, country's readiness to	**DCP Ownership:** (GA selection biased or not transparent, Perception that ESPIG programs are biased (resembles GA's own programs, or GA treats it as if own program; **Lack of clarity:** Roles and accountabilities of different country actors for selection of GA and for ESPIG development **Variability in implementation:** Lack of mechanism to promote stronger use of country public financial management systems or harmonized programs **Lack of clarity:** Decision making authority of LEG unclear; Role of Secretariat is ambiguous and duplicative with GA **Issues of DCP ownership and GA accountability:** Limited 'reporting back' on use of PDG to DCP by GA.	GA selection may be influenced by various dynamics and power relations at country level. The sequencing of ESPIG design presents the risk of the perception that the grant agent shapes the grant rather than the grant priorities guiding the ESPIG. The heavy process of ESPIG risks undermining the ESP development process.	**Recommendation C1** **Recommendation C2**	Grant Agents TOR, December 2017 GPE Charter Grant Agent Terms of Reference, December 2017
Program Development Grant (PDG) *To enable Grant Agents to develop an ESPIG and/or a Multiplier ESPIG, under DCP government leadership*	C	C	A	C	A/D	I	I							

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D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee		Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
ESPIG Program Development *To support ESP/TEP implementation*	A	C	A	R	C	I				fulfil the requirements around sector plan/financing/data, content of Variable Part including indicators). Communicates any concerns about timing or content of PDG application. Works with GA to ensure that the LEG is updated regularly. **Secretariat** ensures that Government, the GA and CA are informed about ESPIG/PDG processes and program quality standards. Provides technical guidance during ESPIG program development (Fixed and Variable Parts). Provide guidance and participates in discussions on funding model requirements. Leads quality assurance of PDG application and decisions on PDG applications. **Committees:** Final review and approval of GA. **Trustee**: Consulted on GA selection.		Risk that CA/LEG members and the GA may not come to agreement on the program content and Variable Part strategies and indicators.	**Recommendation C1** **Recommendation C2** **Recommendation D1**	Fund Governance Document, November 2012; Grant Agent Terms of Reference, December 2017
ESPIG QA and approval	C	C	R	C	A	D	D			**GA:** GA is accountable to own/internal QA and must also respond to Secretariat and LEG comments; **Secretariat**: Accountable to Board for oversight of ESPIG development/application process and QA of application documents **Committees:** GPC examines the	**Duplication/Inefficiencies:** Concurrent, perceived overlapping of QA processes of GA (notably the World Bank) and GPE. **Lack of clarity:** Roles and accountabilities of different country actors.	Perceived overlap of QA on program between Secretariat and some GAs ; Risk of high transaction costs. Risks of weak ownership and quality assurance by country stakeholders (as the official QA process is consultant or	**Recommendation C3**	ESPIG Guidelines

D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee	Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
									findings of QAR III and provides recommendations to Board		external/Secretariat-led).		
Implementation of ESPIG	A	C	A	C	I	I			**DCP:** Accountable for sector level results and implementing the ESP/ESPIG. **LEG:** Involved in monitoring and implementation of ESP. Involved in development and revision process. **GA**: Accountable for use of funds. Reports to GPC via secretariat using internal operational and fiduciary mechanisms. Reviews overall ESPIG progress at least once every six months with Secretariat and reports at least three times a year to the LEG on ESPIG. Offers technical resources and expertise as agreed in the GA selection and	**Lack of clarity:** Role of Secretariat is not clear, regarding country support. **Weak accountability** for results for GPE vis a vis GA own programmes; weak accountability for the quality of grant implementation (content and process) or for system strengthening. Weak GA accountability for monitoring; reporting to LEG or Secretariat **Inefficiencies:** Secretariat gathers disparate	Lack of clarity on CA role (and LEG) vis-à-vis the ESPIG/GA on ESPIG implementation and monitoring, including for the Variable Part; Weak GA accountability for monitoring (timing, and content of reports). Reports may not be sufficiently frequent for course correction or systematically shared with relevant stakeholders.	**Recommendation C4** **Recommendation D1** **Recommendation D2** **Recommendation D3**	Guidelines for Education Sector Program Implementation Grants (ESPIG), August 2018; Grant Agent TOR, December 2017; Fund Governance Document, November 2013 Financial Procedures Agreement Template. Grant Agent TOR, December 2017 Fund Governance
Monitoring and reporting on Grant Implementation	A	I	A	C	C	I	-						

	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee	Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies													
ESPIG Revisions	C/A	C	A	C	C/D	D	D		proposal. **CA:** Reports on progress of ESP implementation, including on funding commitments and disbursements to the developing country partner, the Board and GPE at large through the Secretariat. Invites members of LEG to share lessons learnt regarding grant implementation to inform future country processes. Stays informed of implementation and funding commitments. Ensures that LEG is consulted on program revisions. **Secretariat:** Stay informed on ESP/ESPIG implementation progress, also using the Operational Risk Framework. Reviews and reports to GPC/Board on financial and implementation reports. Provide guidance and process grant revision requests in line w/ ESPIG Policy. **Committees:** Annual review of portfolio on grant performance	information from country reporting to inform portfolio review. ꜩ **Variability in execution:** Different levels of the quality of reporting from GA.			Document, November 2013 GPE Charter Financial Procedures Agreement Section 5.5
Overall													

D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee	Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
Misuse of funds	R	I	A	I	C		D/A	A	**DCP**: Required to have financial management and procurement systems with strong internal controls including procedures to recover misused funds. Communicate findings of misuse, report on measures taken or planned to prevent recurrence, via the GA. **LEG:** Communicate with each other (DPs) on possible/suspected misuse. Communicates via the CA on suspected misuse/credible allegations. Agrees on participants and mediators for the structured mediation in case	**Lack of clarity:** Role negotiation processes are not clearly defined.. There is no role negotiation process as of now.-Conflict resolution procedures are not applied.		**Recommendation 16:** Reduce number of KPIs in next strategic plan	Protocol on Misuse of GPE Trust Funds, Financial Procedures Agreement Template. Governance and Ethics Committee Terms of Reference, February 2017 Fund Governance Document, November 2013 Governance and Ethics Committee Terms of Reference, February 2017 Grant
Conflict resolution	C	C	C	R	I/R	-							

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D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee	Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
Role negotiation	C	C	C						of conflict (Level 2). **GA**: Maintain financial management and procurement processes that seek to prevent and detect misuse, and promptly take actions applicable to address misuse if it occurs. Receive reports form Government on misuse of funds which is reported to the Secretariat. Conduct appropriate due diligence of financial and procurement systems of a DCP government/other entity. Must return funds that it recovered from DCP. **CA**: Communicate with Secretariat on suspected misuse of funds. Serve as mediator of conflict if not party to disagreement (Level 1). **Secretariat:** Receive reports from GA on misuse of funds. Communicate information to Board in accordance with Communications Protocol. Assist GAs/LEGs (if appropriate) to recover funds. Serve as a mediator if conflict is escalated to "Level 3" as per Conflict Resolution Policy, and requested by LEG. **Committees:** Monitor and advice the board where there are allegations of misuse of funds.				Agent Terms of Reference, December 2017 GPE Conflict Resolution Procedures, June 2016

D: Decision-making authority R: Responsible A: Accountable C: Consulted I: Informed Blue: Variability in execution Turquoise: Weak accountability Purple: Lack of clarity Orange: Duplication Pink: Inefficiencies	Government	LEG	Grant Agent	Coordinating Agency	Secretariat	Committees	Board of Directors	Trustee	Explanation of Current Model (as per guidelines/policy documents)	Gaps in current model	Risks of Current Model	Corresponding Recommendations	Guiding documents
									Support mediation if issue is escalated to "Level 4" as per Conflict Resolution Policy.				

Annex 5: Mapping of Grant Agent Institutional Parameters

Summary of views from UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Bank on institutional limitations to implementing the recommendations[8]. In addition to the points below there were some common views that:

- The devil is in the detail with these recommendations. Legal and organizational constraints may apply depending on those details. Some of the changes appear to introduce more layers and processes potentially leading to bottlenecks and delays; important therefore to show how processes and transactions are reduced.
- Recommendations need to take into account the wider context in which the GAs operate in the country and their formal relations with Government and other stakeholders to avoid any unintended consequences which impact the GA's institutional arrangements in the country.
- Establishment of formal reporting accountability to LEG is not legally possible.
- Concern that increased GA reporting to the LEG will lead to the LEG over focusing on GPE processes rather than the wider sector and dialogue.
- Necessary to understand the detail of how the additional grant agent reporting processes will be managed, by whom, and how the data will be used.
- Proposal for the administrative post based in the government for GPE processes and LEG liaison was either welcomed or raised no concerns.

Recommendation	Legal implications	Fiduciary implications	Potential risks
1. Strengthening the partnership and policy dialogue	Some legal constraints depending on the specific recommendation.	None	Overlap and/or cutting across other accountability agreements signed with DCP and donors. Potential additional transactional costs to GA if reporting to LEG is onerous, and to establish the Partnership Compact. Likely to impact timing. Where a LEG is weak, it may have limited capacity to accept additional reports. Unclear what LEG's role in receiving reports would be.

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[8] To facilitate the discussion, a presentation that had been sent to the Coordinating Committee was discussed with each organization. Calls were held separately to talk through the key recommendations. The organizations did not have the opportunity to review a draft of the Board paper.

Recommendation	Legal implications	Fiduciary implications	Potential risks
			Need detail on partnership compact and KPIs operationalisation, including the Secretariat role, to fully comment.
2 Strengthening the ESP and ESPDG	Depends on the details of the specific recommendation	None	Some institutions may opt for ESPIG GA role in preference to ESPDG role, reducing ESPDG Grant Agent candidates, if presumption is that these are different institutions. Co-financing arrangements may be affected if a different ESPDG and ESPIG Grant Agent. Potential transactional costs for selection of separate ESPDG and ESPIG grant agents. Concern on additional processes and transaction costs if the Scoping note introduces an additional layer of work
3 Streamlining the ESPIG application process	No legal constraints.	None	Concern on potential additional transaction costs and processes with an Independent Review Panel; need detail on how this will work. Concern about duplication of institutions' own concept note and QA processes. Pre-defined scoping of the GPE ESPIG may affect opportunities for IDA co-financing.
4 Strengthen GA accountability and transparency for grant implementation	Some legal constraints. Noted that a GA cannot be formally accountable to a LEG.	None	Agency Fees (including when they are due) are subject to the regulations of the GA and decisions of the GA's governance bodies, with little room for flexibility (and only as set out in those regulations). Link between transfer of Agency Fees and level of disbursement may pose problems for World Bank based on current internal financial policies. In practice, this is not a concern for Agency Fees payable to UN agencies as the Agency Fee approach

Recommendation	Legal implications	Fiduciary implications	Potential risks
			proposed is consistent with existing practice in any case.
			Where a LEG is weak or the GPE grant is particularly small, it may have limited capacity or appetite to accept additional reports from Grant Agents.
			Linking the Agency Fees to disbursements of the ESPIG could unintentionally create a perverse incentive for supervising Grant Agents to maximize disbursements, possibly at the expense of fiduciary oversight.
			Need to differentiate between the implementation modalities of the Grant Agent (i.e., "managing entity" or "supervising entity") in considering linking Agency Fees to disbursements.
			In the specific case of the World Bank in its role of GPE Grant Agent the Bank does not implement projects and therefore should not be allocated its fees on the basis of project performance (in fact, a low-performing project may require greater expenditure by the Bank).

Annex 6 Benchmarking GPE against comparator organisations

This annex responds to the Board's request agreed at the Board Meeting in June 2018.

This section looks at how other similar funding/partnership organisations address issues of responsibilities, authorities, resourcing and risk at a county level. Three comparator organisations have been suggested: GAVI, the Global Fund and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Interviews with representatives from the Global Fund and GEF have not been possible, so this analysis is based on documentary evidence and a single interview with GAVI.

The three organisations have similarities to GPE in terms of their overall purpose and global and multi-country reach, though all have slightly different mandates and institutional arrangements as well working in different sectoral areas. This review is not attempting to 'benchmark' in the sense of looking for 'best practice' but more to look at what different organisations do, and the structures, tools and processes used in addressing the organisational challenges of multi-stakeholder working and grant giving. It also assumes that the fundamental structure of GEF at a country level – Developing Country Partner (DCP) at the centre, Local Education Group (LEG), Co-ordinating Agency (CA) and Grant Agent (GA) – will not substantially change; so, the review focuses on how other approaches to tackling country level accountability and responsibility issues can inform and enhance, rather than suggest major alterations to this structure.

All three organisations have had recent reviews/evaluations[9] which explore how they work and the appropriateness and effectiveness of their structures and accountability mechanisms. There are some clear common challenges that all three have faced and which resonate with the issues GPE are trying to tackle:

- How to ensure their organisational/funding framework enhances and develops country ownership and leadership and still ensures accountability for effective use of funds.

- The need to create/support additional mechanisms support system strengthening to ensure 'grant' or activity funding leads to sustainable change.

- Balancing the development of partnership and collaboration (and expected mandate particularly amongst UN 'family' organisations) with transparency and results focused decision making, particularly on who should manage grants

- The level to which oversight, authority for decisions, performance and fiduciary risk and conflict resolution requires structural independence to manage potential (or perceived) conflicts of interest or multiple roles.

- Developing management tools and performance management systems which are both rigorous enough to allow for effective reporting to funders, with effective checks and

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[9] GAVI 2016 cross country full country evaluations report; 6th Comprehensive Evaluation of GEF (2018); Global Fund 2015 Strategic Review

balances, yet easy to use and not overly burdensome for grant 'managers' or developing country governments

- The need to build in flexibility of approach at a country level so management approaches that can provide differentiated levels of risk, support and process based on context and varied levels of government capability.

GAVI

GAVI is legally the GAVI foundation and is registered in Switzerland with the same privileges and immunities accorded to other treaty-based international organizations. The GAVI Board is responsible for strategic direction and policy-making, oversees the operations of the Vaccine Alliance and monitors programme implementation. The Board is comprised of 18 "representative" seats, 9 seats for independent or "unaffiliated" individuals and one seat for GAVI'S CEO. UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation hold permanent seats; representatives of other GAVI partners serve on A time-limited basis

It has a secretariat of approximately 300 staff all based in Switzerland. As well as administering the GAVI Board, the secretariat develops the Alliance's strategy and policies, mobilises resources, coordinates programme approvals and disbursements, fosters partnership, strengthens accountability among partners and raises public awareness of immunisation and the impact of the Alliance. It also undertakes monitoring and evaluation, legal and financial management and oversees knowledge and information management

GAVI have made significant changes into how they operate at a country level to enhance the impact of their funds. A 2016 evaluation highlighted the need to develop local country ownership of Capacity Assessments and other GAVI processes; and to try and simplify roles.

GAVI has traditionally not had a presence on the ground with Health Ministries taking the lead, working with WHO regional and country offices. To address issues of weak capacity at government level, limited government ownership, differences in country context and the need for a more coordinated system strengthening approach a Partnership Engagement Framework (PEF) was developed.

The four key principles of the PEF are: clear country focus, a differentiated approach, transparency and accountability. Support from the PEF provides targeted country assistance, foundational support and special investments in strategic focus areas and is mainly provided through putting full-time staff in partner country offices. They assist in planning and implementing GAVI support and help develop 3 to 5-year portfolio view including the rationale for programme support. A bespoke grant performance framework (GPF) is created for each country which reflects the intended results chain for all GAVI grants to that country – from inputs, activities to intended outcome.

Requests for new support are reviewed three times per year by the Independent Review Committee (IRC), which is comprised of independent experts in public health, epidemiology, supply chain, development finance and economics. The reviewers make recommendations to Gavi based on the extent to which investments are likely to achieve the proposed result.

Funds either go directly to UNICEF's supply division for the purchase of vaccines or to countries, NGOs and international partner organisations directly through the PEF framework.

An annual review – joint appraisal – of implementation progress is undertaken in country by a team including staff from the Ministry of Health, members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (ICC) AND Health Sector Coordinating Committee (HSCC) which includes Civil society organisations, and staff from the GAVI secretariat and Alliance partners. GAVIs High-Level Review Panel reviews and renews support to the country.

Risk management of grant activities consists of three levels:

- Active management by GAVI country teams, working with partners and implementing countries
- Checks and balances on primary activities carried out by GAVI's Programme Capacity Assessment, Grant Performance Monitoring, Finance, Operation and Legal teams
- Independent auditing by the Audit and Investigations team

The Board has a number of committees which also provide programmatic and policy oversight

- Governance Committee
- Investment Committee
- Audit and Finance Committee
- Market-Sensitive Decisions Committee
- Evaluation Advisory Committee

There are also additional teams which have been created to focus on how the effectively the alliance is working: The Alliance Coordination Team (ACT) provides operational oversight and coordination across the Alliance and addresses flagged and unresolved issues; Regional Working Groups are used to coordinate, oversee and troubleshoot any country immunisation issues.

GAVI have captured these changes in a new 'Alliance Accountability Framework'. At a top level this focuses on strategic indicators and targets and alliance KPI. It is then broken down into three pillars which looks at PEF performance management – PEF functions, targeted country assistance and strategic focus areas; Secretariat performance – cascading corporate, team and individual performance metrics; and Country Grant Management – grant performance metrics, joint appraisal, independent evaluation.

Global Evaluation Facility (GEF)

At a Global level GEF has an Assembly composed of all 183-member countries who meets every 3 to 4 years at ministerial level to review general policies and evaluate GEF's operation; the Council is GEF's main governing body and comprises 32 members appointed from developed (14), developing (16) and countries (2) in economic transition. It develops, adopts and evaluates the operational policies and programmes of GEF funded activities. The World Bank is the trustee.

The Secretariat is led by a CEO who has the status of Vice-President in the World Bank structure with the requisite authorities of that position. The Secretariat implements Assembly and Council decisions and coordinates and oversees programmes. It ensures policies are implemented in consultation with GEF Agencies, chairs interagency group meetings to ensure effective collaboration and coordinates

with the secretariats of the five conventions[10] it acts as a financial mechanism for and which inform operational criteria/guidelines for GEF projects.

The GEF does not have a country presence but works through 18 GEF Agencies (mainly multilateral and UN family organisations but also one NGO) who create project proposals and then manage these projects on the ground. They support and help eligible governments and NGOS to develop, implement and execute the projects. Agencies may work together on GEF projects pooling expertise.

Each of the GEF member countries has GEF focal points. There are two type of these, political and operational. These serve as liaison with the Secretariat and GEF Agencies. All GEF member countries have political focal points, only recipient countries eligible for GEF support have operational points. Operational focal points are responsible for the operations of GEF activities within their countries including reviewing and endorsing project proposals.

The GEF uses a Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) who provide scientific and technical advice on policies, operational strategies, programmes and projects. The panel consists of 6 members who are international recognised experts in the GEF's key areas and are supported by a global network of experts and institutions.

The STAP is required to have a geographical and gender balance and individuals should have experience in the management of science and knowledge in the implementation of complex international initiatives as well as technical expertise. They should also have an appreciation of the organizational and operational setting of the Implementing and Executing Agencies, particularly the context of program and project development and implementation

GEF also has an independent Conflict Resolution Commissioner who reports directly to the CEO and works directly with member countries, GEF agencies and other stakeholders to help resolve disputes and address complaints and other issues relevant to operations.

The recent 2018 evaluation highlighted how the STAP and the Evaluation office were key elements of the accountability structure but recommended they be supported by a results-based management system which operated at a country level and moved beyond inputs and outputs. It needed to show the value add of programmes, provide clear agency performance metrics and evidence of lesson learning.

The evaluation also highlighted other key issues:

- There is often overlap between governance and management functions, in particular the Council still plays a role in reviewing project documentation

- Lack of transparency – particularly in the choice of agency – in decision making. Projects are still seen to be awarded to agencies based on their country presence and not necessarily due to their competitive advantage

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[10] Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), UN Convention on Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and Minamata Convention on Mercury

- The ability of the GEF to work through multiple agencies overall has been positive, though relationships between agencies has shifted to one of collaboration to one focused on accountability.

- In undertaking a 'benchmarking' exercise (including GPE as one of its comparator organisations) the evaluation commented on the limits of comparability but did highlight GEF's lack of an independent Chair.

The Global Fund

The Global Fund has a similar status to the GAVI – a Swiss Foundation with the privileges and immunities accorded to treaty-based organisations. The Board has state and non-state actors and sets strategy, governs the institution and approves all funding decisions. The secretariat is based in Geneva and is responsible for day-to-day operations, Providing support to implementers, the implementation of Global Fund strategies and policies, Fundraising and relationships with donors.

Each implementing country establishes a Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) which includes representatives of all relevant sectors. Their role is to coordinate the development of the national request for funding; nominate the Principal Recipient of those funds, oversee the implementation of approved grants and approve any changes/reprogramming requests. They also ensure linkages and consistency between Global Fund Grants and other national health and development programmes. They are supposed to focus on the 'big picture' and ensure performance-based funding is on track but not focus on day-to-day details of grant implementation.

CCMs must comply with the six Eligibility Requirements to be eligible for funding.

1. They must have undertaken a transparent and inclusive concept note development process
2. Held an open and transparent Principal Recipient selection process
3. Overseeing programme implementation and have an oversight plan
4. Document the representation of affected communities
5. Ensure representation of non-governmental members through transparent and documented processes
6. Develop, publish and follow a policy to manage conflict of interest that applies to all CCM members across all CCM function

In the revised funding model, requirements 1 and 2 are assessed at the time of Concept Note (CN) submission; requirements 3 to 6 are assessed annually through the CCM Eligibility and Performance Assessment (EPA)

The Principal Recipients are financially and programmatically responsible for the implementation and monitoring and evaluation of grants including coordinating any contracted sub-recipients. They can be any organisation from a government ministry to a community-based organization or private sector entity. Grant performance is managed through a Grant Dashboard which provides the CCM with data on financial and management performance and programmatic status.

The Global Fund has a Technical Review Panel (TRP) who are independent group of experts drawn from HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, human rights and gender, health systems and sustainable financing. In addition to supporting the financing of effective programs, the Technical Review Panel also reports on the lessons learned from funding request reviews for applicants, technical partners, the Secretariat and the Board. The Technical Review Panel is headed by the Chair, who is also an ex-officio member

of the Strategy Committee of the Global Fund Board. The TRP also has an important role to play in the development and implementation of the Global Fund strategy as an advisory body to the Global Fund Board.

The TRP is headed by the Chair, who is also an ex-officio member of the Strategy Committee of the Global Fund Board. Review panel members serve for a period of 4 years, are appointed by the strategy committee and serve in a personal capacity. They conduct reviews up to 4 times a year and receive an honorarium for services provided and travel expenses. Strict rules are in place to manage conflict of interest.

Oversight and accountability of the TRP is initially through an annual self-assessment of performance to the Strategy Committee. They review the assessment and evaluate the TRP's effectiveness in fulfilling its terms of reference and respond accordingly. Performance of individual TRP members is assessed by the TRP Chair and Vice-Chair(s) and taken into consideration in the identification of Serving TRP Members for each review process or other TRP work. The TRP works with the Secretariat to develop a systematic feedback loop from applicants and partners on the quality of technical recommendations provided by the TRP, to be managed through the GAC to prevent undue influence on the TRP and safeguard its independence. Financial propriety and grant implementation progress are monitored and verified by Local Fund Agents. These are independent consultants appointed through a competitive process who act as the 'eyes and ears' of the Secretariat on the ground. They also undertake capacity assessments of grant recipients. Th Secretariat also has multi-disciplinary teams (Finance, Procurement, M&E, Legal) and are supported by the Global Fund's Office of the Inspector General, an independent body reporting directly to the Board who conducts audits and investigations to minimise any risk of misuse of funds.

The recent 2015 Strategic Review highlighted the importance of country ownership and leadership and also the importance of not having a 'one-size fits all' approach to resource allocation and process management, in particular when working in fragile states. It is important that process shouldn't get in the way of where resources are most needed recognising that financial and fiduciary risk needs to be managed, though the review did suggest that the Global Fund might wish to review its risk appetite in different scenarios.

Summary of Relevant Structures for Effective GPE working at Country Level

The table below aims to synthesise the approaches taken by the comparator organisations to address issues of country level roles and accountability, partnership development, grant oversight and risk management. Some key themes/approaches have emerged which have informed the suggested recommendations for the GPE

- The use of an independent Review Panel of experts to assess the quality and implementability of grants at the proposal stage helps minimise concerns over transparency and potential conflicts of interest as well as supporting a system strengthening approach.

- All three comparator organisations recognise that it is important to monitor partnership engagement and to create clear expectations about what is expected, and this can support country ownership as well as enhance system wide performance

- Country level processes need to be as light as possible, but they should be aligned and support a clear performance framework for all partners which is effectively and preferably independently monitored.

Comparator Assessment of Benchmark Organisations

	Gavi	GEF	Global Fund
Key challenges in country model identified	• Need to develop local country ownership of Capacity Assessments and other GAVI processes • Identified need to try and simplify roles	• Often overlap between governance and management functions (e.g. Council still plays a role in reviewing project documentation) • Lack of transparency – particularly in the choice of agency – in decision making. Projects are still seen to be awarded to agencies based on their country presence and not necessarily due to their competitive advantage • Shift in relationships to one of collaboration to one focused on accountability	• Need to avoid a 'one-size fits all' approach to resource allocation and process management • Process should not get in the way of where resources are most needed
Accountable for Grant Performance	Country Governments Partner agencies Partners' engagement framework management team	GEF Agents	Principal Recipients – responsible and accountable for sub-contractors Country Coordinating Mechanisms
Decentralised accountability Mechanisms	Country specific Grant Performance Framework Joint Appraisal Process Alliance coordination team Regional working groups	Project documentation (aligned with World Bank processes)	Grant Dashboard – Recipients responsible to CCM, who are responsible to the Board Country Coordinating Mechanisms
Partnership/collaborative working and accountability for system strengthening	Alliance Accountability framework Partnership Engagement Framework Secretariat Performance Framework Joint Appraisal Process	'Overall Performance Study' includes Partnership Health Survey, which looks at quality of governance/leadership and partnership interactions Country Capacity Development Scorecard, project and programme (not a direct fit – but includes assessing engagement and other enabling	Country Coordinating Mechanism – 2 phases a) concept note development and b) implementation, representation, conflict of interest policy Global Fund Partnership Forum

	Gavi	GEF	Global Fund
		environment/system strengthening factors Country Support Programme Independent Conflict Resolution Commissioner	
Review of New Grants	Independent Review Committee	Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel	Technical Review Panel
Independent oversight/QA of Grant Implementation	Annual Joint Appraisal GAVI High level review panel Board Committees Evaluation Advisory Committee Gavi Evaluation Policy Independent Review Committee Audit and Finance Committee Gavi Alliance Independent Auditor Selection and Evaluation Policy	Independent Evaluation Office	Local Fund Agents (independent consultants) report to Secretariat Secretariat M&E Technical Evaluation Reference Group Office of the Inspector General Local Fund Agent
Risk Management	GAVI Country Teams Gavi Risk Policy, Gavi Risk Policy Operational Framework, Gavi Investment Policy Secretariat Capacity Assessment Grant Performance Monitoring, Finance, Operation and Legal Team Independent Audit and Investigations team	World Bank systems and processes	Secretariat (finance, procurement, M&E, legal teams) Local Fund Agents (independent consultants) report to Secretariat Office of the Inspector General – independent reports directly to Board Global Fund Risk Management Policy The Global Fund Policy to Combat Fraud and Corruption
Addressing Partnership Issues	Independent Assessment Committee	Independent Conflict Resolution Commissioner	Country Coordinating Mechanism

Annex 7: Summary of Evidence institutional assessments of effectiveness and efficiency of partnership working

The table below is adapted from the OPM report on Examination of key actors' roles in GPE's country-level operational model towards GPE 2020 delivery, Volume II, Annexes. Findings from the OPM study have been added to update the evidence.

Document	Key findings or recommendations
Local Education Groups	
Evans Review, 2012	• Many LEGs are weak, lack diversity of membership. • There should be more CSO members. • Secretariat should be clear about expected performance and give support.
Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support, 2015	• There is an ambiguous accountability relationship between the LEG, Board and Secretariat. • The Board has no real leverage over the LEG, and the Secretariat cannot easily strengthen a LEG.
Interim Evaluation, 2015	• Recognise improved activity and diversification of LEGs • LEGs are stronger in the planning phase than implementation and monitoring. • There is still a challenge with inclusion of civil society and the private sector. • **Secretariat management response:** Recommend defining roles, responsibilities and minimum standards for LEGs.
More Effective Operational Platform, 2015	• Too much rigidity in any standards for LEGs would undermine government ownership and national capacity. • Recommend LEG minimum standards are developed, and monitor LEG performance in the Results Framework.
Board, June 2016	• Draft LEG minimum standards had been developed and were discussed. • Mixed response – it was felt to be unclear if these would provide support and guidance and the extent of the enforcement expected which could cause distortions in local contexts.
SIC, May 2017	• SIC requests the Secretariat to develop an evidence-based approach for strengthening guidance for LEGs.
OPM study 2018	• LEG ideally should be the only multi-stakeholder sector entity • Enable government leadership of LEG; orient LEG to national objectives • Enable more meaningful representation of stakeholders • Accountability for GPE grant processes through monitoring by the LEG -focus on performance and results rather than planning processes

Document	Key findings or recommendations
Grant Agents	
Evans Review, 2012	• The World Bank has too much of a hegemony over supervising entities. Other donors need to take on the SE role – through accreditation and stepping up. • New aid modalities should be piloted in line with ESPs
Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support, 2015	• Recognise that some partners want to open up the SE/ME role to get more competition, but a certification process needs to be in place given the fiduciary risk.
Interim Evaluation, 2015	• There is still a heavy reliance on the World Bank, although there are now 11 SEs/MEs SEs/MEs are not accountable enough to DCPs and the LEG • Could national actors take on the GA role? • **Secretariat management response:** Secretariat to look at clear selection criteria for the SE/ME.
More Effective Operational Platform, 2015	• Introduces the 'grant agent' terminology. • Recommendations include: • Transparent, consistent cost recovery for GAs • Minimum standards for GAs • Define situations where GA is not required • Introduce reporting standards and timelines. • Criteria for GA selection • Throughout: note that too much rigidity undermines government ownership and risks distortion.
Governance, Ethics, Risk and Finance Committee, 2016	• Consideration of Direct Access: paper looking at implications if the Board wants to consider direct funding for ESPDGs or small ESPIGs. The paper suggests using Direct Access where the grant is small, there is strong PFM, there is already a pooled fund.
OPM Study 2018	• The MOE should be in the driving seat and the process should not be driven by a donor agency • Clarify accountability for GA performance and improve monitoring of GA role • Improve the visibility of GPE in-country, as not always possible to distinguish the GAs' work on GPE from that of their own programmes • Greater GA country presence to strengthen country relationships • Secretariat to facilitate coordination between key actors and clarify expectations
Coordinating Agencies	
Interim Evaluation, 2015	• The CA provides valuable support, particularly up to grant approval. • The role, held by DPs, may stifle LEGs and local participation. • Could national actors take the role of CA?
OPM Study 2018	• Resource the CA responsibilities for their role • Strengthen the CA position to more effectively work with the LEG, foster inclusive dialogue, and help the DCP in the grant process

Document	Key findings or recommendations
	• Clarification of CA responsibilities in practice, especially in relation to the GA • Secretariat to increase communication transparency, support, and country visits to buttress the CA's work
Secretariat	
Evans Review, 2012	• There should be more Secretariat presence in-country to distinguish GPE from the World Bank. • Suggest setting up an independent technical advisory group for quality assurance of ESPs and grant applications.
Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support, 2015	• GPE is 'missing on the ground'. Ratios for countries per country lead is too high, especially for fragile and conflict affected states. • QA needs to be improved but whilst keeping government ownership. Recognise the major organisational review of the Secretariat in 2014 and introduction of the QA unit in 2015.
Interim Evaluation, 2015	• Need more clarity on the Secretariat's roles at country level, and the resources for it. • The Secretariat's contributions (guidelines, support and visits) are valued. • **Secretariat management response:** Secretariat is focusing on strengthening support to countries, improving grant management, QA, monitoring and technical advisory capability. • Still to consider: minimum standards, QA framework, conflict resolution mechanisms and M&E.
More Effective Operational Platform, 2015	• Recommendations: • Set up an independent technical appraisal of ESPs. • Methodology and minimum standards for grant QA. • Conflict resolution mechanism.
OPM Study 2018	• Specific ToR and clearer guidance on roles required for CLs; the balance between facilitation and oversight is not clear • More support from the CLs is necessary where key actors need help Greater Secretariat presence and visibility in country • Greater oversight of GAs, CAs and LEGs • Support to strengthening LEGS • Streamline GPE processes and reporting requirements
Context	
Evans Review, 2012	• GPE needs to become more flexible to respond to context, particularly fragile and conflict affected situations.
Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support, 2015	• Secretariat support should be higher in fragile and conflict affected states.
Interim Evaluation, 2015	• More technical assistance is needed for implementation and monitoring in fragile and conflict affected states.
More Effective Operational Platform, 2015	• Recommendation: • Develop an Operational Risk framework

Document	Key findings or recommendations
Board, June 2016	• The Operational Risk framework looks at country and sector grants, with a differentiated risk-based approach for QA and monitoring. • FCAS/emergency situations can to Transitional Sector Plans, and use accelerated funding to access 20% of the grant on the basis of the emergency plan (this has been since 2010)
OPM Study 2018	• More support in Fragile and conflict affected states • Greater focus on implementation phase of ESP and GPE grants

Annex 8: List of partners consulted in the EPR exercise

Name	GPC	DCP	CA	GA	LEG	HQ/ Sec	Organization	Country specific GPE experience
Emmanuelle Abrioux		1	1	1			UNICEF	Ethiopia, Lao PDR
Niki Abrishamian		1	1				UNICEF	Zimbabwe; Pacific/Vanuatu
Youssouf Ahmat		1			1			Chad
Enrique Alasino							World Bank	
Marcellus Albertin	1	1						OECS, Saint Lucia
Baikuntha Prasad Aryal		1						Nepal
David Baysah	1	1			1			Liberia
David W. Baysah	1						Minister of Education, Liberia	
Saodat Bazarova		1	1				World Bank	Tajikistan
Saurav Dev Bhatta		1	1				World Bank	Bangladesh, Nepal
Alice Birnbaum			1				Canada	Tanzania
Marie Brüning	1						Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Switzerland	
Stephane Cadeau			1				Save the Children UK	
Gwang-Chol Chang		1					UNESCO	
Natalia Cherevatova		1	1				World Bank	Malawi
Eshetu Cheru	1	1						Ethiopia
Vigdis Cristofoli		1	1		1		UNICEF	Norway; Malawi
Helen Cron			1				UNICEF	Guinea, Haiti
Grant Dansie	1						NORAD	
Kiri Drollett			1				UNESCO	
Arnaud Drouet			1				UNESCO	
Martha Ekirapa		1						Kenya
Dagny Fosen		1					UNESCO	
Takaho Fukami		1	1	1			UNICEF	Uzbekistan, Timor Leste, Lao PDR
Marianne Kujala-Garcia		1					Finland	Ethiopia, Nepal, Mozambique
Sally Gear	1						DFID	
Lily Neyestani-Hailu		1					UNESCO	
Bolor Jamiyandagva		1						Mongolia
Ibrahima Kabore		1						Burkina Faso
Santosh Khatri		1					UNESCO	
Mengitsu Koricha		1					Save the Children	Somalia
Janet Lennox							UNESCO	
Nesmy Manigat		1						Haiti
Fatoumata Marega		1					UNESCO	
Miriam Mareso		1	1				UNICEF	Comoros
Esther McFarlane		1					UNESCO	
Johanna McGilvray			1				DFID	
Jeffrey Mettille	1						USAID	
Abdallah Mohamed		1						Djibouti
Hilaire Mputu		1					UNESCO	
Mohamed Muhamed		1					Save the Children	Somalialand

Name	GPC	DCP	CA	GA	LEG	HQ/ Sec	Organization	Country specific GPE experience
Lily (Meskerem) Mulatu			1			1	World Bank	Western and Central Africa region
Innocent Mulindwa		1	1				World Bank	Malawi, Uganda
Valere Munsya		1						DRC
Ken Ndala		1						Malawi
Liz Ninan		1					World Bank	Uganda
Reiko Okumura							UNICEF	
Danny Padilla			1				UNESCO	
Maxwell Rafomoyo	1						Education Coalition of Zimbabwe	
Patrick Ramanantoanina		1	1				World Bank	Djibouti, Haiti, Madagasca
Abdulhaq Rauf								Afghanistan
Douglas Sumerfield	1		1				World Bank	Liberia
Wendy Wheaton			1				USAID	South Sudan
Jessica Winn				1			Save the Children UK	
H.E. Alim Hadidya Youssouf	1						Minister of Basic Education Cameroon	

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